Mikhail Suslov

Genealogy of the Idea of Monarchy in Post-Soviet Political Discourses of the Russian Orthodox Church

Mikhail Suslov - Research Fellow, Center for Russian and Eurasian Studies, Uppsala University (Sweden), mikhail.suslov@ucrs.uu.se

This article focuses on the concept of monarchy with the emphasis on its traditional Russian "autocratic" model. The author inquires into the ways this concept is being used in today's Russian Orthodox Church and in the circles of religiously motivated intellectuals. Inspired by the "contextualist" tradition in conceptual history, this article traces the concept of "monarchy" back to the pre-revolutionary and emigre thinkers and argues that the two understandings of it have been evolving throughout Russia's modern history: the tradition of "god-kingship" (tsarebozhie), now largely marginalized, and the Slavophil interpretation that made a substantial shift towards the idea of popular sovereignty and is now dominating the official and mainstream Orthodox political thought. This Slavophil concept of monarchy is internally contradictory and instable, what makes its usage problematic, but at the same time, it opens the possibility of a new and original theorizing.

Keywords: Russian Orthodox Church, monarchy, monarchism, sacred kingship, popular sovereignty, Slavophil, "Bases of the Social Concept".

BEFORE the FALL of the monarchy in February 1917, the center of Russia's political world for many centuries was the figure of the autocratic tsar. Political theorists justified the monarchy and proposed measures to strengthen it, and ordinary people passed on the skills of "monarchy language" and "monarchical feelings"from generation to generation. Even antimonar-

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The ideological discourses of the early twentieth century were paradoxically associated with deep - rooted monarchism, since its very criticism often arose from the opposition of the real tsar to the idealized image of the monarch1. But the opposite is also true: sometimes the understanding of an autocratic monarchy led intellectuals to recognize the need for radical reform and abandon loyalty to a particular tsar in the name of the triumph of an ideal autocracy.2 The fact is that monarchism, like political traditionalism in general, resists rational reflection and theoretical analysis. The monarchist case is already lost at the moment when the monarchist undertakes to defend his political beliefs in a reasoned manner. In the ideal world of a monarchist, such a situation cannot even arise due to the" naturalness "and" self-evidence " of the monarchical structure.

That is why in Russia, with its thousand-year experience of monarchy, monarchism as an ideology was paradoxically underdeveloped, which played a fatal role for the Romanov dynasty: the pre-revolutionary regime was unable to secure mass support in the conditions of the competitive policy of the early XX century. Some monarchists openly refused to speculate on the topic of power, claiming that autocracy in Russia belongs to the realm of faith, mysticism, and feelings and cannot be analyzed. 3 Rationally arguing the impossibility of rational self-government in Russia.-

1. From recent studies devoted to the nuances of (anti) monarchical consciousness, we can point to: Kolonitsky B. I. "Tragic Eroticism": Images of the Imperial family during the First World War. Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2010, pp. 552-565. In an earlier period, monarchical mythology was the basis of mass protest movements - and not only in Russia. See the rich literature on this, for example: Field, D. (1976) Rebels in the Name of the Tsar. Boston: Houghton Mifflin; Hobsbawm, E. (1971) Primitive Rebels: Studies in Archaic Forms of Social Movement in the 19th and 20th Centuries. 3rd ed. Manchester: Manchester University Press.

2. Compare: Lukyanov M. N. Russian conservatism and Reform, 1907-1914. Stuttgart: Ibidem-Verlag, 2006. pp. 54-59.

3. Compare Vasily Rozanov's statement "Tsarist power is a miracle" (V. V. Rozanov On the implied meaning of our monarchy, St. Petersburg, 1912);"...Russian Autocracy... it cannot but seem like a supernatural matter, which is satisfactorily explained only by the participation of Providence in the destinies of peoples "[Chernyaev N. Mysticism, ideals and poetry of the Russian Autocracy, Moscow, 1998, p. 18]. Sergei Bulgakov wrote that before his "conversion" to the monarchists, he "did not like the Tsar", since "the question of the monarchy is, in essence, a question of love or dislike" (Quoted from: B. Kolonitsky "Tragic Eroticism": Images of the Imperial Family during the First World War, p. 10).

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On the basis of their arguments about the monarchy, they fell into the liar's paradox. As a result, pre - revolutionary Russia had many intellectuals who were staunch supporters of the monarchy, but few monarchists. Thus, the notorious Konstantin Pobedonostsev, whose rehabilitation in post-Soviet Russia played a major role in the formation of modern conservatism, was certainly a convinced monarchist, but his theoretical reflections on the monarchy were unoriginal and insignificant for intellectual history. Other monarchist intellectuals who tried to develop original monarchist doctrines found themselves under suspicion and sometimes under arrest by the authorities, for whom even right-wing dissidents were primarily dissidents.

The Orthodox Church, which had a long history of interaction with the monarchy in the history of Russian statehood, has always been a faithful helper for the rulers. However, by the end of the imperial period, the relationship between the church and the monarchy had become problematic. Criticism of "caesaropapism", that is, the nationalization of the church, was increasingly voiced in the church environment.4 On the other hand, the inherited intellectual tradition of sacralization of the monarchy increasingly came into an insoluble contradiction with the modernization processes, and after the Manifesto of October 17, 1905, 5 it generally sounded like a mockery or at best a legend about the distant past. Finally, some attempts at an analytical understanding of autocratic power, which will be discussed below, created an ideological tension between reality and the depicted ideal, thereby undermining the real dynasty. Taking an honorable first place in Uvarov's political formula " Orthodoxy. Autocracy. Narodnost", the Orthodox Church did not rush to the aid of the shaken dynasty in 1917. As you know, shortly after the abdication of Nicholas II from the throne, church leaders hurried to express their joy at the release of the Church from state guardianship and initiated the following measures:-

4. See, for example: Hedda, J. (2008) His Kingdom Come. Orthodox Pastorship and Social Activism in Revolutionary Russia, pp. 153 - 175. DeKalb: Northern Illinois University Press.

5. The third paragraph of the Manifesto read: "To establish as an unshakable rule that no law can take effect without the approval of the State Duma", thereby, at least formally, abolishing the autocratic power of the tsar.

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proper correction of doctrine and worship services 6. In fact, the position of the top Orthodox clergy on the issue of monarchy was one of the most important factors in the desacralization of autocratic power and the development of the revolutionary process in the spring and summer of 1917.

In modern Russia, the real interaction between the church and the monarchy in the pre-revolutionary period is often idealized, and the popular image of tsarist power is popular among significant groups of the population. A recent VTsIOM poll (March 2013) showed that 24% of Russians have nothing against the idea of restoring the monarchy; a similar survey in 2006 gave a figure of 19% of potential monarchists. At the same time, the number of opponents of the monarchy also increased slightly - from 66% in 2006 to 67% in 2013. Thus, we can talk about the stabilization of the number of sympathizers of the monarchy at the level of about 1/5 of the population.7
At the moment, the weakness of political monarchism has several explanations. First, it is a significant break with pre-revolutionary political thought and tradition. The systematic "cleansing" of the country of monarchical elements in the 1920s led to the fact that the center of the Russian monarchical tradition completely shifted to emigration. Divided into several directions and dynastic lines, the current representatives of the House of Romanov abroad are unknown and uninteresting in modern Russia. The monarchical tradition in the Russian Orthodox Church is not so much renewed as created from scratch. Despite the massive reprinting of pre-revolutionary monarchist theorists by nationalist and right-wing publishers, the current level of political discussions about autocracy remains quite low. The assimilation of the monarchist ideology at the everyday level does not go beyond the peculiarly understood and rather superficial ideas. This is why public discussion of the theory of monarchy rarely comes out

6. These church reformers included, for example, Archpriest John Rapturous, author of the Monarchical Catechism of 1911. Cf.: Resolution of the Moscow Metropolitan Council of Deans [March 7, 1917] / / Babkin M. A. (ed.) Russian clergy and the overthrow of the monarchy in 1917. Materials and archival documents.: Indrik, 2006. p. 193 _ 195. Cf. the resolution of the Local Council not to sing "Many Summers" to the emperor and members of his family (Ibid., p.379), which meant that the Church tacitly supported the abolition of the monarchy in Russia.

7. Monarchy in Russia: Past stage? [March 19, 2013] //VTSIOM website.

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beyond the discussion of the historical merits and aesthetic appeal of the pre-revolutionary empire, that is, the monarchy is more a marker of a certain worldview than a product of rationalistic theorizing and political design. Monarchism has not yet been represented evenly and at the institutional level by political parties and movements on an all-Russian scale. So, only in 2012, the country's first Monarchist Party of the Russian Federation, headed by the Ural tycoon Anton Bakov, was registered with the Ministry of Justice.8
Second, the fragmentation of monarchists is not conducive to successful institutionalization. Even at the end of the Soviet period, there were two main camps of monarchists: the "legitimists", who claim that the Romanov dynasty still has rights to the Russian throne, and the" conciliators", who demand that the issue of the monarch's candidacy be resolved by a popular vote ("sobor"). Legitimists also do not represent a monolithic movement, since various dynastic calculations and legal systems of different countries allow us to name several possible applicants. The Russian Monarchist Party, for example, supports the candidacy of Prince Karl-Emich of Leiningen, who recently converted to Orthodoxy and took the name Nikolai Kirillovich. According to the "conciliators", a Local zemsky sobor should be convened, and like the council of 1613, it should elect ("summon", as supporters of this view prefer to say) a tsar, not limited to one particular dynasty.9
Does all this mean that today we cannot consider monarchism as a serious ideological force in modern Russia? Probably, monarchism still has a great potential for growth and exit from the" gray zone "of political marginality in Russia against the background of disillusionment with liberal democracy and the" tightening of screws " by the modern regime. The purpose of this article is to show that monarchism plays an important role in the political philosophy of Orthodoxy and cannot be ignored

8. "The Monarchist Party of Russia is established in Moscow" / / Moscow News. 2012. April 7.

9. For example, this position is supported by Archbishop Gabriel (Chemodakov) of Montreal and Canada. For modern monarchists, see, for example: Russian monarchists - who are they? // Russkaya mysl. October 17, 1996; Krylov A. The Heirs of False Dmitry // Russian news. July 15, 2013. N 14-15.

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in political discussions outside the church. One of the central theses of the "Fundamentals of the social Concept of the Russian Orthodox Church" adopted at the Council of Bishops in 2000 (points III. 1 - III. 7), is devoted to this problem. To understand the importance that modern Orthodox intellectuals attach to monarchism, in this article I will trace the ideological " genealogy "of monarchism in Russian political theory through a" slow "reading of the" Fundamentals of the Social Concept "(hereinafter referred to as" Fundamentals") and reconstruct the intellectual context to which they refer.

The theoretical basis of this research is the concept of ideology, which is interpreted here as the "decontestation" of political discussion. This refers to the ability of ideology to fix the meaning of concepts that are "esstentially contested" outside the system of ideology. For example, we will not understand what a person means by the word "freedom" until we find out in what ideological context it is used, in other words, until we decide whether this person adheres to the ideology of liberalism, or, for example, socialism. Similarly, the concept of "monarchy" means different things in different contexts: in the understanding of liberal democracy, it has one meaning, and Russian traditionalism has another.10 On the other hand, the concept of "monarchy" (like any other "essentially controversial" concept) has a complex internal structure and dynamics. Therefore, the study of the concept of "monarchy "involves two analytical strategies: contextualization (that is, the search for an intellectual context that captures the meaning of" monarchy " at a certain point in time11) and morphological analysis of the concept.

The main thesis of the article is that the Russian Orthodox Church accepts mainly the Slavophil interpretation of autocracy in its late Imperial version. On the one hand, this is really one of the most carefully designed monarchical doc-

10. This research strategy and theory of ideologies was developed by Michael Frieden. See: Freeden, M. (1998) Ideologies and Political Theory: A Conceptual Approach. Oxford: Clarendon.

11. The contextual approach was developed by the so-called "Cambridge School" of Intellectual History, of which Quentin Skinner was the most influential in this work. See Skinner, Q. (1969) "Meaning and Understanding in the History of Ideas", History and Theory 8 (1): 3-53; Skinner, Q. (2002) Visions of Politics: Regarding Method. Vol. 1. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

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trin on Russian soil. On the other hand, it emerged during the decline of the monarchy and as its intellectual "support". During this era, the theory of monarchy was "modernized" by including elements of nationalism and the concept of popular sovereignty. But at the same time, the understanding of the monarchy became contradictory, as the question of the ultimate source of power - the divine will or the people's will - remained suspended in the air. The "archeology" of monarchical thinking in the Russian Orthodox Church shows that the cultural layers of monarchism, as they are developed in modern Russia, are not able to form a sufficiently solid foundation for ideological constructions, since the modern theory of monarchy cannot get rid of Slavophil paradoxes.

Is the monarchy preferable in the opinion of the leadership of the Russian Orthodox Church?

We do not have reliable sociological data on the prevalence of monarchical ideas among the clergy and laity of the Russian Orthodox Church, but some scattered facts suggest that these ideas find much more response in the church than the national average.12 What is the position of official Orthodoxy on this issue? The Definition of the Council of Bishops refers to "the lack of respect for the Church of any state system, any of the existing political doctrines, any specific social forces and their figures, including those in power"13. This statement is quoted-

12. See Turunen, M. (2007) "Orthodox Monarchism in Russia: Is Religion Important in the Present-Day Construction of National Identity", Religion, State and Society 35 (4): 319_334. See also a small sample of interviews among clergy for the portal www.regions.ru. Of the six Orthodox priests, six support the monarchy, while none of the Muslim and Jewish religious leaders support the monarchy (Clergymen on the monarchist idea [March 15, 2012] / / News Agency Regions.ru).

13. On the relationship of the Church with the state and secular society in the canonical territory of the Moscow Patriarchate [1994] / / Official website of the Moscow Patriarchate. Patriarch Alexy II consistently supported the concept of"disrespect". In response to a question about whether the monarchy is the best political system, he said:: "For the Church, there cannot exist any eternal and imperishable national-state arrangements" (Alexy II (Riediger), Patriarch. Light in the dark. Interview of Patriarch Alexy II of April 6, 1991 / / Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate. 1991. N 7. p. 4). On the contrary, Metropolitan Kirill already in those years developed a generally positive attitude towards the monarchy, linking the perturbations of the twentieth century in Russia with the weakening of Orthodoxy

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For example, in the " Fundamentals "(III. 7, paragraph 3), where it is particularly emphasized that the ROC does not interfere with the free choice of people about the forms and methods of government" or at least does not oppose it " (III. 7, paragraph 1). Quite reasonably, the same paragraph (III. 7, paragraph 3) of the Fundamentals states that the principle of "non-respect" is related to the fact that the main concern of the Church is "not [in] the system of external organization of the state, but [in] the state of the hearts of its members" 14. There is no "sign of equality" between monarchism and Orthodoxy, the publicist Alexander Arkhangelsky, in the pages of the Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate, speaks about the permissibility and conditionality of all forms of government, "except for unalloyed totalitarianism and misanthropic regimes." 15
It would seem that we can put an end to this and close the topic "monarchism in Orthodoxy". However, for the authors of the "Fundamentals", these arguments only frame the central thesis of point (III. 7), which justifies the hierarchy of forms of state power: the era of Judges (judging), monarchy, democracy. At first, when judging, " the authorities acted not through compulsion, but by the power of authority, and this authority was communicated by Divine sanction." Then ," under a monarchy, power remains God-given, but for its implementation it uses not so much spiritual authority as coercion." Finally, modern democracies "do not seek the divine sanction of authority" (III. 7, paragraph 2). In the next paragraph, the main message is highlighted in bold:"...We cannot completely exclude the possibility of such a spiritual revival of society, when a religiously higher form of state organization becomes natural "(III. 7, paragraph 3). Thus, the "Foundations" recognize that different forms of state power have different attitudes to religion and morality, some of them "religiously higher", others less. Naturally, the former are preferable to the latter for the Church, so

and monarchism (Kirill (Gundyaev), Metropolitan. Vozrozhdenie Pravoslaviya i obnovlenie Rossii [Revival of Orthodoxy and Renewal of Russia].

14. Wed.: Cyril (Gundyaev), Metropolitan. Report of Metropolitan Kirill on June 9, 2008 / / Official website of the Moscow Patriarchate.

15. XX vek v istorii Rossii: Kruglyy stoll [XX century in the history of Russia: A Round table]. 2010. N2. P. 73. Cf.: "The symphony of Church and state is possible in a variety of forms and with a variety of state systems, excluding two extremes... this is tyranny and anarchy." Orthodoxy is not limited to monarchy / / NG-Religions. 2012. March 7).

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how "religiously higher" forms offer more opportunities for caring for the "state of the heart." But if the form of government depends on morality, then the Church cannot be indifferent to the form of government. In this sense, the monarchy is good not only from the point of view of its political functionality, but also because of its special beneficence in relation to the religious needs of the population. This calls into question the thesis that a particular state system is "disrespectful"; its paradoxical inclusion in the same paragraph that refutes it is intended to smooth over the rather strong impression of the Church's resolute position on the political issue.

The ideas of the authors of the "Fundamentals" are widely used among the clergy of the Russian Orthodox Church. So, as Archpriest Alexander Shargunov notes, " the Orthodox monarchy... provides the majority of people with the most favorable conditions for salvation. " 16 In the context of recent political debates, Archpriest Gennady Belovolov has discussed the soul-saving nature of the Orthodox monarchy as follows:"...If an Orthodox Tsar were in power, can you imagine that he would remain indifferent to the murder of his loyal subjects in the womb?! I think that on the very first day of his ascension to the throne, the Orthodox Sovereign would have forbidden this outrage... Or what kind of Tsar would allow the extradition of his young loyal subjects to families of overseas citizens with a complete change of faith and citizenship." Then, in the comments to his own text, he clarified his position: "In a democracy, you will be forced to occupy your heart with sneakers, and in the Orthodox Kingdom you will have more opportunities to' occupy your heart with God '" 17.

The internal inconsistency of the "Fundamentals" of the monarchy was noted by the priest Dmitry Sverdlov (banned from serving for 5 years from January 14, 2013): "Fundamentals of the Social Concept... they leave a mixed impression when it comes to the monarchy. For example, it says that "the Church accepts the appropriate choice of people" when it comes to "forms and methods of government." On the other hand, only mo-

16. Alexander (Shargunov), Archpriest. Prot. ' s answers. Alexandra Shargunov [15.11.2008] / / Russian House. 2008. N 11.

17. Gennady (Belovolov), Archpriest. "He gave the formula of our national being" / / Russkaya narodnaya liniya. September 17, 2010.

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narhia along with theocracy... of all possible types of social organization, it is called "God-given" in the document... This ambiguity leaves the ecclesiastical man with a wide field of dreams about the monarchy"18.On the other hand, opponents of the monarchy can also refer to the same points of the "Fundamentals" in support of their position. For example, the magazine "Thomas", approved by the Publishing Council of the Russian Orthodox Church, adheres to a skeptical position in relation to the monarchy. In 2008, the magazine organized a special forum "Should an Orthodox person be a monarchist?", which was attended, for example, by one of the founders of Osnov, Professor Andrey Zubov. He argued that " when a society begins to rise in its Christian consciousness, then the monarchy eventually becomes unnecessary... Because people can find their own ways in walking before God. " 19 That is, his position, based on the interpretation of the same "Fundamentals", is directly opposite to the above-mentioned position of prot. Alexander Shargunov.

It should be noted here that the monarchist argument in the Fundamentals has nothing to do with constitutional law. The "legal" terminology of the "Foundations" is vague and vague: roughly the same thing is called "social order", "form and method of government", "form of power", "power form", "form of state organization" (III. 7). From the point of view of constitutional law, compare monarchy and democracy (III. 7, paragraph 2) is as meaningless as comparing apples and oranges, since they characterize different aspects of the state: the form of government (monarchy and republic) and the political regime (democracy, authoritarianism, totalitarianism). The concept of "judging" would have puzzled any legal scholar.20 The fact is that when talking about monarchy, "Osnovy" refers to a different intellectual tradition, in which monarchy means exclusively traditional Russian autocracy, the foundations of the Russian state.

18. Sverdlov D. Autocracy - the desired illusion [21.03-2012] // Nezavisimaya Gazeta. NG-Religions. 2012. N5 (300).

19. Should an Orthodox person be a monarchist? // Thomas. 2008. N 3 (59).

20. According to Konstantin Kostiuk, the concept of "judging" is a "valuable discovery" of the "Fundamentals", since its absolute inaccessibility and irrelevance "allows us to equally eliminate all [really existing] political forms" and thereby make the thesis of "disrespect" more convincing (Kostyuk K. N. History of social and ethical ethics). thoughts in the Russian Orthodox Church, St. Petersburg, 2013, p. 364).

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which is sought in the biblical story of the first kings of Israel. Thus, historically and geographically, the local phenomenon of autocratic monarchy rises to the level of a universal model of the "social system". Nevertheless, the proposed hierarchy-the judiciary, monarchy, and democracy - still divides on different grounds, as it leaves significant gaps: for example, the European monarchies of the period of absolutism, which "did not seek the divine sanction of power", except in symbolic terms (that is, they were not monarchies in the sense of "Foundations"), were still not democracies in any sense of the word.

In any case, Osnovy noted that from a religious point of view, "monarchy" is preferable to "democracy", which right-wing intellectuals did not fail to note.21 The statement about the preference of the monarchy should be understood in the context of two other important theses of the "Foundations"; the first of them states that the state and the Church have different "natures": "The Church was founded directly by God Himself... the divine establishment of state power reveals itself indirectly in the historical process" (III. 3, paragraph 1). This interpretation gives a high status to the church's understanding of political phenomena, including the church's interpretation of the monarchy. Secondly, one of the most controversial issues in the Fundamentals, which immediately caused friction with the authorities, 22 is the recognition of the right of the church to "refuse to obey the state" if the latter forces believers to commit sinful acts or renounce their faith (III. 5, paragraph 4). Taken together, these theses form the normative foundation for the ROC's opposition activities. Despite all the uncertainty of what is a sinful act and what actions lead believers to renounce their faith, almost any decision of the state can be considered by church radicals as a reason for civil disobedience. Given the significant dependence of the Russian Orthodox Church on state structures, the expression of monarchical sympathies by the highest hierarchs of the Church cannot remain without consequences, so both the "Basics" and after-

21. See, for example: V. Semenko. Whom God wants to destroy, he deprives of reason [Radonezh, 2000. N 9] / / Russian Church at the Turn of the century. Saint-Petersburg, 2001, p. 160.

22. Researchers cite evidence that the Kremlin expresses dissatisfaction with the monarchist theses of the "Foundations": see, for example, Richters, K. (2013) The Post-Soviet Russian Orthodox Church: Politics, Culture, and Greater Russia, p. 24. London and New York: Routledge.

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the following official political statements by church leaders soften the "but, but and..."impression 23.

Two bodies of the King: the tradition of theology "tsarebozhiya"

Somewhat coarsening the picture, we can talk about two traditions of the perception of" monarchy " in the ideology of Russian Orthodoxy. One of them closely links the Church and the autocracy, referring to the historical experience and writings of the Church fathers. The second, on the contrary, builds a tradition of the church's existence independently of autocracy or even in spite of it. 24 The political history of Byzantium and Russia offers a lot of evidence for both points of view, since periods of support for the Church by the monarchical state were followed by periods of persecution (for example, iconoclasm in Byzantium) or complete subordination of the Church to power structures (the so-called "Synodal Period").. A similar ambivalence is present in the biblical story of the first kings of Israel, which formed the basis of the interpretation of the monarchy in the "Foundations" and which is generally central to the Orthodox understanding of the monarchy. Metropolitan Philaret (Drozdov) wrote in 1848: "The Creator... He himself raised up judges and leaders for this people; He Himself reigned over this kingdom... finally, He Himself made kings over him, continuing the miraculous signs of His sovereignty over the kings." And then he continues: "Maybe they will say that all this was in the times of the Great Patriotic War.That is, for him there is no fundamental difference between the period of the prophets and the subsequent period of the kings; both belong to the same category of "theocracy", since even later, during the reign of the kings, divine power over the people continued through God-given rulers. Naturally, for him, the transition to the monarchy

23. It is noted in the literature that the "Fundamentals" are written in the style of " however, but also...", which makes it possible to reach a certain tactical compromise, but is losing from the strategic point of view of the development of theological ideas in Orthodoxy (K. Kostyuk). History of social and ethical thought. p. 361. In his analysis, the author refers to the article: Morozov A. "The New Course" and the Moscow Patriarchate / / NG-Religions. 2000. N 15 (62)).

24. In general, we can speak of two traditions of the Christian church's relationship to the state, one of which is that "the politically motivated crucifixion of Christ, the persecution of the apostles and the first martyrs, from the very first days of Christianity's existence, created in it an experience of alienation and distrust of the state" (KKK. History of social and ethical thought, p. 17).

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it wasn't a" fall " or some kind of devolution. With an ornate reference to the Russian Empire, the Metropolitan writes that nothing has changed in essence in our time either: "Has God ever renounced His divine rule over the world and the human race, and especially over those kingdoms and peoples in which His spiritual kingdom is mainly confined and distributed, or to which His spiritual kingdom is particularly concerned...?" 25 In his presentation, the story of how King Saul was deposed is omitted altogether, and the discussion of the new The period begins with King David 26. Thus, he avoids even mentioning a situation in which a monarchical ruler might lose his divine sanction and, as a consequence, his throne. His story about the first kings of Israel focuses on the moment of David's anointing to the kingdom, and Philaret emphasizes that this happened long before his actual accession. This, according to the theologian, is explained by the fact that by divine providence, David had to be raised above ordinary people before he became king, in order to emphasize the fact of a transcendent sanction for his power, regardless of his personal exploits (they took place after the anointing) or the choice of the people.

Such an interpretation can be called standard for many traditional monarchies, including the Russian one, whose theory, in comparison, for example, with the English monarchy of the Elizabethan era, was much less developed both theologically and legally. The concept of power proposed by Metropolitan Philaret expressed not so much the uniqueness of the Russian "theology of power" as the immaturity of the latter, which did not differ much from the concepts of the European Middle Ages. What these theories had in common was the concept of the" two bodies of the king", according to which the king's personality consisted not only of an" earthly " physical nature, but also, through the anointing of the kingdom, of some transcendent entity.27 The latter made the earthly king a" reflection "of Christ, a sacred and inviolable being, an" anointed one of God", who was the "holy Spirit".-

25. Filaret (Drozdov), Metropolitan. Christian teaching about the royal power, Moscow, 1888 [1848], p. 5.

26. Ibid., pp. 10-11.

27. Kantorowicz, E. (1997) The King's Two Bodies: A Study in Mediaeval Political Theology [1957], pp. 47 - 87. Princeton: Princeton University Press. Ср.: Staats, R. (1976) Theologie der Reichskrone: Ottonische "renovatio imperii" im Spiegel einer Insignie. Stuttgart.

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rom "we must obey not as a man who governs the people, but as God himself." 28
In medieval Russia, the idea of the divine foundation of earthly power and the character of tsarist rule as a "living image" of its sacred prototype was also established. "29 According to Joseph Volotsky," The Tsar is by nature similar to all people, and the power is similar to the highest God. " 30 Michael Cherniavsky's fundamental work shows the evolution of the concept of the sacredness of the sovereign in medieval Russia. It analyzes how the dual image of a prince - a" saint on a throne "(i.e., a passive passion-bearer, an imitator of Christ, as, for example, Saints Boris and Gleb 31) and a" holy sovereign " (i.e., a military commander, a martyr for the cause of Christ, as, for example, Alexander Nevsky) - gave birth to the concept of a God-given person. the power of the Orthodox tsar, who is not only "holy" himself, but is also the key to the salvation of his people and state.32 The theology of" tsarebozhiya " assumed that the royal power itself has a divine origin and does not need special sanction from the church.33
28. Kovalevsky V. Introduction / / Kovalevsky V. (ed.) About the royal power. In memory of Monk Jonah. St. Petersburg, 2011. P. 9. Agamben refines Kantorovich's analysis with the help of the concept of homo sacer; in his opinion, the idea of the tsar's persona follows from his historically established status of untouchable, located outside any jurisdiction, and therefore primarily political. Cf.: Agamben J. Homo Sacer. Sovereign Power and Naked Life, Moscow: Europe, 2011.

29. Andreeva L. A. Sacralization of power in the history of Christian civilization, Moscow, 2007, p. 193. The same idea is expressed in the medieval concept of the "two bodies of the king". Cf.: "The Christian ruler becomes a christomimetes-that is, in the literal sense, an" actor "or" incarnator "of Christ-who, in turn, presented on the earthly stage the living image of the two-natural God" (Kantorowic, E. The King's Two Bodies, p. 47).

30.Cit. by: Andreeva L. A. Sacralization of power. p. 201.

31. Konstantin Kostiuk notes that the holy princes were canonized "not in the perspective of their imperious dignity, but as passion-bearers" (K. Kostiuk). History of social and ethical thought, p. 61). If we understand the author's idea correctly, we can hardly agree with it, since the princes were glorified as passion-bearers precisely because they were princes. A simple calculation made by Michael Cherniavsky shows that out of 14 Kievan princes (from Vladimir Svyatoslavovich to Andrey Bogolyubsky), 10 were canonized; out of 12 Moscow sovereigns from the end of the XIV to the end of the XVI century, seven were canonized, and the canonization of the eighth - Ivan the Terrible - is being discussed in society. Thus, in medieval Russia, virtually "all princes were regarded as saints" (Cherniavsky, M. (1962) Tsar and People: Studies in Russian Myths, p. 32. New Haven and London: Yale University Press).

32. Cherniavsky, M. Tsar and People, pp. 22 - 23, 76.

33. Andreeva L. Sacralization of power. p. 201.

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As in Western Europe in the Middle Ages, the concept of the sacred authority of the king expressed the desire of the secular ruler to gain greater autonomy from the church.34 This partly explains the continuation of the tradition of sacralization of power in the XVIII and XIX centuries, when cultural processes were already developing in the direction of secularization, and the decree of 1680 prohibiting the deification of the tsar continued to operate.35 In 1766, in the new edition of the Pre-Succession to the Week of Orthodoxy, which was valid until 1917, the following was included in the number of anathematizations proclaimed by the clergy on behalf of the church:: "To those who think that Orthodox Sovereigns are not elevated to thrones by God's special favor, and when they are anointed to the kingdom, the gifts of the Holy Spirit are not poured out on them for the passage of this great title: and so to those who dare to rebel against them and commit treason: anathema." 36 Another relatively late example is the regicide of March 1, 1881, which in Orthodox and right-monarchical circles, it was described in medieval language as a martyr's death, redeeming the sins of both the people and the government itself.37
In Russia, the Orthodox rite of chrismation of the tsar is known to have combined two traditions: the anointing of the tsar to the kingdom with myrrh, typical of Byzantine and Western European monarchical practice, and the sacrament of chrismation, performed in Russian Orthodoxy after baptism. The rite of chrismation of the king is similar to the sacrament of chrismation-it symbolizes the second birth, thereby exalting the king above ordinary mortals and giving him a special sacred status. Also, the communion of the king eventually begins to resemble

34. For more information, see Figgis, J. (1914) The Divine Right of Kings. 2nd ed. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

35. Zhivov V. M., Uspenskiy B. A. Tsar and god: Semiotic aspects of sacralization of the monarchy in Russia / / Uspenskiy B. A. (ed.) Yazyki kul'tury i problemy perevodimosti [Languages of Culture and Problems of Translation], Moscow, 1987, p. 75; Baehr, S. (1991) The Paradise Myth in Eighth-Century Russia: Utopian Patterns in Russian]. Early Secular Russian Literature and Culture, pp. 27-29. Stanford: Stanford University Press.

36. On the rite of Orthodoxy // Website of the Cathedral of Christ the Saviour.

37. For example, for John of Kronstadt, Alexander II "became a figure somewhat analogous to Christ, who died for human sins and salvation" (Kitsenko N. Saint of our time. Father John of Kronstadt and the Russian People, Moscow: Novoe literaturnoe obozrenie, 2006, p. 290). Cf.: "The holy blood of the Tsar-martyr" (A. Khoinatsky, prot. What is primarily needed from us in view of the terrible events of recent times? Moscow: Univ. tip., 1881. p. 2).

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to receive the priest's communion, as if confirming the idea that the kingdom and the priesthood "are two of the greatest gifts", two statuses of equal sacred significance 38.

Konstantin Kostiuk argues that in contrast to the West, the theology of power in medieval Russia developed in the opposite direction - in the direction of endowing power with sacred properties and blurring the distinction between the "two cities", as a result of which the tsarist government was assigned a church mission and eschatological function, and the role of the people as a political subject was ignored 39. However, in the 19th and early 20th centuries, the ideological search was directed towards revising the traditional sacralization of power in the 19th century. It cannot be denied, however, that the tradition of theology of "tsar-God" continued in the 20th century, although it ceased to be at the center of political theology. Thus, S. N. Bulgakov wrote that "The tsar carries his power like the cross of Christ, and ... obedience to Him can also be the cross of Christ and in His name." 40 K. I. Zaitsev argued that " only in terms of ecclesiastical understanding can one understand who the tsar is. Only in the Word of God can we find the answer to what the Russian Orthodox kingdom is. " 41
What was mainstream in medieval Russia and existed as a traditionalist alternative to modernizing ideological projects at the end of the imperial period has been pushed to the sidelines of political debate in modern Russia. Post-Soviet right-wing Orthodox thinkers also support Tsarbozhye. For example, V. L. Kovalevsky writes that " the Russian Tsar was chosen to serve by God Himself. He was a messenger and servant of the Heavenly Father: a living instrument of the all-governing right hand of God, the executor of God's destinies... "V. K. Nevyarovich asserts that" the Orthodox monarchy can (and should)be established to consider the section of Orthodox teaching as an integral, sufficiently theologically developed and formulated by the fathers and learned men of the Church", is based on the following principles:-

38. Zhivov V. M., Uspensky B. A. Tsar and god. p. 24; Kostyuk K. N. Istoriya sotsial'no-eticheskoi mysli [History of social and ethical thought]. pp. 87-88.

39. Kostyuk K. N. Istoriya sotsial'no-eticheskoi mysli [History of social and ethical thought] . pp. 108-109, 115.

40.Cit. by: Kolonitsky B. I. "Tragic erotica". p. 10.

41. Zaitsev K. I. To return to Russia. Selected articles 1923-1968, Moscow, 2010, p. 259.

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which is based on the story of King Saul 42. In his interpretation of this story, Nevyarovich refers to A. P. Lopukhin, a professor at the St. Petersburg Theological Academy, who claimed that "during the time of the judges, the entire life of the people, both religious and moral, as well as state-social and family, became disordered... In the absence of a firm authority to oversee the enforcement of laws, morality is a major problem... In this interpretation, the establishment of the monarchy was not only not a "fall", but meant a transition to a higher level of moral perfection in public life.44 References to Archbishop Seraphim (Sobolev), the author of the political treatise "Russian Ideology", are also popular in modern monarchical literature, in which he examines in detail the circumstances of Saul's anointing, refuting the opinion that the royal authority "was established as leniency". The Archbishop writes that" through their desire to have royal power, "the people of Israel did not" commit a fall, a sin. The word prizreh [1 Samuel 9: 16] refers not to condescension to sin ... but to its [the people's] sufferings and to the establishment of royal authority as a means for their salvation."45
In the context of the theology of "tsar-God", we can also consider right-wing radical trends among Orthodox intellectuals who develop eschatological and Messianic ideas of the Russian tsar as a "deterrent", that is, they consider the tsar as a force of universal significance that saves the whole world from sliding into hell.46 It is impossible to say unequivocally that attempts to revive the medieval theology of "tsarebozhiya" are marginal for modern Orthodoxy; a number of influential religious methods have been used in the past.-

42. Nevyarovich V. K. Blessed is the kingdom. Church foundations of the monarchical Idea in Russia, St. Petersburg, 2004, p. 32.

43. Nevyarovich V. K. Blessed is the kingdom. P. 38; Lopukhin A. P. Biblical history in the light of new research and discoveries. Old Testament, Ed. 2-E. T. 4. Pg., 1915, p. 64.

44. Cf.: Nevyarovich V. K. Blessed is the kingdom. p. 39.

45. Seraphim (Sobolev), Archbishop. On the true monarchical worldview. Moscow, 2002. pp. 67-68. Cf.: "Christian tsarist power derived its origin directly from God, the Heavenly King" (Seraphim (Sobolev), Archbishop of Russkaya ideologiya // Seraphim (Sobolev), Filaret (Drozdov), John (Maksimovich). Russkaya ideologiya [Russian Ideology], Moscow, 2000, p. 87).

46. Alexander (Shargunov), Archpriest. Orthodox Monarchy and the "New World Order", Moscow: Novaya Kniga Publ., 1999.

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dia, including Radio Radonezh and the Russkaya Narodnaya Liniya news agency, adhere to this argument.

Monarchoscepticism in the Russian Orthodox Church

As we have seen, the position of the "Foundations" is very different from the theology of the "King of God". First, the Fundamentals state that "in ancient Israel, before the period of Kings, there was the only true theocracy in history" (III. 1, para. 3). Secondly, the Fundamentals make it clear that "the Lord... He regrets that they [people] have abandoned God's law" (III. 1, para. 3), that is, regret is expressed precisely in connection with the change of government from "judging" to "monarchy". Patriarch Kirill expresses with the same certainty that during the" judging " period, morals gradually fell, faith weakened, and sinfulness increased among the people of Israel. Therefore, the introduction of royal power was a "profound spiritual tragedy" of ancient Israel, which renounced direct God's rule and placed an earthly ruler over itself.47
The interpretation of the establishment of a "monarchy" as a certain decline, lowering of the moral level, is also found in the Orthodox thought of the late XIX-early XX centuries. Thus, Archbishop Andronik (Nikolsky) in 1907 remarked: "We must completely free ourselves from the artificial stretch that is usually made from the Holy Scriptures in asserting the exceptional correctness and perfection of only a strictly monarchical way of government. I ask every reader of mine not to be afraid... if I, a convinced tsarist, say emphatically that there is no such evidence in the Holy Scriptures. " 48 In his opinion, the Prophet Sa-

47. Cyril (Gundyaev), Patriarch. The Word of the Shepherd (1991-2011). Sobranie trudov. Vol. 1. Moscow, 2013. pp. 247-248. Cf.: "Even the monarchy is perceived in this document [Fundamentals of the social concept] with regret, as the abandonment of God's correction" (Chaplin V. The Church is not only people in cassocks, it is part of our people / / Official website of the Moscow Patriarchate. August 9, 2013); compare the words of Archpriest Georgy Mitrofanov: "Monarchy, like statehood in general, is the result of the fall of the first people..." (Should an Orthodox person be a monarchist? // Thomas. 2008. N 3 (59)); "And when the people demanded of the last judge Samuel to give them a king... the Lord was angry with his people... and the very establishment of the kingdom was a punishment for Israel." Orthodoxy is not limited to monarchy / / NG-Religions. 2012. March 7).

48. Andronikos (Nikolsky), Archbishop. Creations: Articles and notes. Tver, 2004. Book 1, p. 353.

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mu'il anointed Saul as king only so that " the Jews would not forget God at all, "and therefore royal authority is only" protection and provision against great evils, " and is not sacred.49
This interpretation of the monarchy is close to the position of N. A. Berdyaev, expressed in the pages of the magazine "Put", where there was a controversy about the interpretation of the story of Saul. Berdyaev objected to the biblical justification of monarchism and the idea of God-giving the tsar, which was proposed by A. Petrov and Grigory Trubetskoy.50 According to Berdyaev, the Old Testament describes the conflict between theocratic and monarchical ideas, so the power of the tsar is the result of the fall of morality, the unwillingness of people to live under direct theocracy. 51 The philosopher concluded that " monarchy... It belongs entirely to this world, the kingdom of Caesar, and its features are not transferable to the Kingdom of God", and therefore there is no defining connection between Orthodoxy and the monarchy 52. The "Eurasian" Nikolai Alekseev agreed with Berdyaev, arguing that monarchism is a pagan political concept, and true Christianity should avoid the heresy of "tsarobodism"53.

This second line in the Orthodox theology of the monarchy recognizes the idea of the God-likeness of the tsar as heretical and blasphemous idolatry. In recent decades, the "liberal" camp of church intellectuals has continued Berdyaev's tradition. Thus, Abbot Veniamin (Valery Novik) confirmed the pagan roots of the monarchical idea and said that autocracy frees people from the burden of freedom and responsibility.

49. Ibid., pp. 354-355.

50. Petrov A. Letter of a monarchist to the editorial office of the journal "Put". 1926. N 3. pp. 134-139; Trubetskoy G. Dispute about the monarchy. 1926. N 4. pp. 172-175.

51. Berdyaev N. A. Diary of a philosopher. The dispute about monarchy, bourgeoisness, and freedom of thought. 1926. N 4. pp. 176-182.

52. Berdyaev N. A. The Kingdom of God and the kingdom of Caesar. 1925. N 1. Pp. 31-32. Cf. with the statement of Sergei Bulgakov:"...Although the nature of royal power is characterized by a certain theurgy, however, the latter did not displace or replace the natural, "animal" principle of power. It has not yet become theocratic... for her, it was equally possible to inspire good as well as evil" (Bulgakov S. N. Svet nevecherniy, Moscow: Respublika, 1994 [1917], p. 340). See also: "There is no dogmatic connection between Orthodoxy and a certain political form" (Bulgakov S. N. Autocracy and Orthodoxy // Bulgakov S. V. N. From Marxism to Idealism, Moscow, 2006).

53. Alekseev N. N. [Christianity and the idea of monarchy]. 1927. N 6. pp. 15-31.

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what the Grand Inquisitor suggests in Dostoevsky's The Brothers Karamazov 54.

The question of the divinity of tsarist power was raised by the same Council of Bishops in 2000, which adopted the "Fundamentals", in connection with the canonization of Nicholas II and members of his family. The issue of canonization caused a lively debate in society, and the decision taken by the Council was a compromise between the position of the right and the opponents of canonization. The former insisted on recognizing the canonization of the royal family and its servants as martyrs, as was done by the Russian Orthodox Church Outside of Russia (ROCOR) in 1981. As a result, the Cathedral glorified Nicholas II, the Empress and their children as passion-bearers.55 The difference between" passion - bearers "and" martyrs " is that only a person who has suffered for his faith can be a martyr, while a person who has suffered martyrdom in imitation of Christ can be a passion-bearer. In addition, the Council specifically emphasized that Nicholas II was canonized not as a tsar and not for his political activities or ideological beliefs, but as a private person. Finally, the Council noted that the canonization of Nicholas II does not mean the consecration of the monarchy as a whole.56 Despite the historical dubiousness of this decision, the Council tried to overcome the medieval Orthodox tradition of sacralization of rulers and at the same time gain support from the right-wing supporters of canonization (and especially from the ROCOR).

In 2009, the film "Tsar" about the conflict between Tsar Ivan IV and Metropolitan Philip was released in cinemas-

54. Veniamin (Valery Novik), abbot. Orthodoxy. Christianity. Democracy. St. Petersburg, 1999, pp. 274-275.

55. In a report to the Council of Bishops, Metropolitan Juvenal (Poyarkov), Chairman of the Synodal Commission for the Canonization of Saints, examines in detail the arguments for and against the canonization of the royal family, and concludes that Emperor Nicholas II, Empress Alexandra, Tsarevich Alexey, Grand Duchesses Olga, Tatiana, Maria and Anastasia suffered and suffered before their deaths. "It is in understanding this feat... Commission... finds it possible to glorify in the Cathedral the New Martyrs and confessors of Russia in the face of the passion-bearers " (Juvenal (Poyarkov), Metropolitan. Report of Metropolitan Juvenal of Krutitsky and Kolomna, Chairman of the Synodal Commission for the Canonization of Saints / / Official website of the Moscow Patriarchate).

56. The Russian Church at the Turn of the Century, St. Petersburg, 2001, pp. 14-18; Slater, W (2005) "Relics, Remains and Revisionism: Narratives of Nicholas II in Contemporary Russia", Rethinking History: The Journal of History and Practice 9 (1): 53 - 70; Bodin, P. -A. (2009) Language, Canonization and Holy Foolishness: Studies in Post-Soviet Russian Culture and the Orthodox Tradition. Stockholm: Acta Universitatis Stockholmiensis.

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pom shot by director Pavel Lungin. Oleg Yankovsky, who played the role of Metropolitan, took a blessing from Patriarch Alexy II, and the filming itself began with prayers to St. Philip. The film's consultants were theologian Alexander Dvorkin and Hieromonk Kosma (Afanasyev). The film received positive reviews from the Russian Orthodox Church and therefore can be considered as expressing a more or less official position of the Moscow Patriarchate on the issue of the relationship between the Church and the kingdom as a whole. A very negative attitude towards Ivan the Terrible is especially emphasized by two episodes of this film. In the first of them, the tsar is tempted to manifest his supposedly divine powers and summon lightning, and the lightning does sparkle, but the metropolitan declares that this power has not a divine, but a diabolical source.57 The second episode, by contrast, depicts the metropolitan himself already in prison, when the shackles miraculously fall from him and he discovers in himself the gift of foresight and healing by the imposition of hands. 58 Highly appreciating the film, Protodeacon Andrey Kuraev called it symptomatic that it was released a few months after the enthronement of Patriarch Kirill, becoming a kind of illustration of the relationship between the tsar, the church and the people. 59
The film "Tsar" is related to the Orthodox theology of the monarchy in many ways, including as an illustration of the idea expressed in the same "Fundamentals" that the tsar can lose divine sanction. The story of King Saul, given by The Basics, shows that his power passed to David without any regard for dynastic principle. Moreover, in contrast to Philaret's interpretation, the Fundamentals specifically emphasize that David was the son of a common man (III. 1, paragraph 4), who nevertheless earned divine favor and was anointed King-

57. Compare the assessment of traditional autocracy by Sergey Averintsev in the context of the binary logic characteristic of Russian culture: "Autocratic power is something that is either above the human world or below it, but in any case it does not seem to be included in it" (Averintsev S. S. Byzantium and Russia: Two types of spirituality / / Novy mir, 1988. N 7. P. 220).

58. См. подробнее: Halperin, Ch. (2013) "Ivan the Terrible Returns to the Silver Screen: Pavel Lungin's Film Tsar", Studies in Russian and Soviet Cinema 7 (1): 61 - 72.

59. " Is it by chance or not that this film was released in the first year of the new patriarchate? Isn't Patriarch Kirill also going to become the heir not only to the throne of St. Philip, but also to his cross? Isn't this film a kind of spiritual testament from St. Philip to Patriarch Kirill" (Kuraev A.V. Tsar / / LJ of Andrey Kuraev. November 9, 2009).

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location. Contrary to the views of right-wing intellectuals who want to canonize Ivan IV as a "holy and faithful tsar" 60, the film "Tsar" shows Ivan the Terrible as a bloody tyrant. Thus, it reflects the position of the highest hierarchs of the church, according to whom " pseudo-believers of Orthodoxy and autocracy... tyrants and adventurers are arbitrarily canonized. It is not known whether these people act meaningfully or unconsciously. Meaningfully, they are provocateurs and enemies of the Church who are trying to compromise the Church ... " 61.

The film shows the moral failure and political collapse of Ivan the Terrible and thus prepares a criticism of the dynastic principle on the grounds that a person who does not fit this role can ascend to the throne. Archpriest Dimitri Smirnov, first deputy chairman and chief of staff of the Patriarchal Commission for Family and Maternity Protection, argued, with reference to current political developments in Russia, that a strong presidential power with the transfer of power to an appointed "successor" is better than a monarchy that does not guarantee the birth of children from accidents. Metropolitan Hilarion expressed a similar opinion, according to which the monarchy is not the best form of government, since in history there have been different monarchs, worthy and not, and different presidents.-

60. A recent initiative of supporters of the canonization of Ivan the Terrible-a demand to remove Ilya Repin's painting "Ivan the Terrible and his Son Ivan on November 16, 1581" from the halls of the Tretyakov Gallery on the grounds that it is " vile, slanderous and false both in its plot and its pictorial reproduction "and" offends [ ... ] patriotic feelings of Russian people " ("This picture offends the patriotic feelings of Russian people" / / Russkaya narodnaya liniya. October 2, 2013). The appeal to the Minister of Culture Vladimir Medinsky was signed by Vasily Boyko-Velikiy, Igor Froyanov, and priest (former) Alex Averyanov.

61. Alexy II (Riediger), Patriarch. On the attempts of pseudo-believers of Orthodoxy to canonize tyrants and adventurers on their own // Orthodoxy and the World. 15-12.2001. Wed. with the statement of Patriarch Kirill: "Tsar John the Terrible... he did lawless things... a sea of blood was shed in Russia" (Kirill (Gundyaev), Patriarch, Sermons 2009-2010. St. Sergius Lavra, 2010, p. 96) and Metropolitan Hilarion: "Ivan the Terrible... he turned into a bloody tyrant who led the country to a socio-economic crisis... "(Metropolitan Hilarion (Alfeyev). Conversations with Metropolitan Hilarion, Moscow, 2010, p. 148.) See also: On the question of the canonization of Tsar Ivan the Terrible and G. E. Rasputin. Appendix No. 2 to the report of Metropolitan Juvenal of Krutitsa and Kolomna / / Official website of the Moscow Patriarchate. June 7, 2008.

62. "Russian Hour". TV program from June 23, 2009.

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you, and the monarchy itself does not exclude the transfer of power to an unworthy heir 63.

Patriarch Kirill, for all the idealization of pre-Petrine Russia, also refrains from unequivocally supporting the autocracy. He gives voice to the canonical Slavophil version of harmony between the tsar, patriarch and people in Moscow Russia. The system of" checks " of the tsarist power included the authority of the church, church councils, zemstvo councils, and the practice of petitioning, that is, the direct appeal of subjects to the tsar. Therefore, the ancient Russian autocracy, according to Patriarch Kirill, did not resemble Western absolutism, coming quite close to the ideal of the "symphony" 64. At the same time, the fact of the church's belittled position during the Synodal period, when it became part of the state apparatus, has not been forgotten.65 Recognizing the merits of autocracy in the past, Patriarch Kirill revises the formula of "symphony" so that the concept of "monarchy" is replaced by the concept of "state" as a whole. In particular, he has repeatedly argued that it is precisely today, in post-Soviet Russia, and not in the pre-revolutionary period, that relations between the church and the state come closest to the ideal of "symphony", that is, mutual non-interference in the affairs of their exclusive "jurisdiction" and mutual support in other areas66. The theme of autocracy is often present in the discourses of church leaders "apophatically", through absence; thus, speaking of the "calamities" that befell Russia after 1917, Patri-

63. Hilarion (Alfeyev), Metropolitan. Hilarion in the program of the Soyuz channel, January 25, 2013.

64. Cyril (Gundyaev), Patriarch. Be true to God. Minsk: Belorusus Publishing House, Exarchata Publ., 2010, pp. 250-251. (Gundyaev), Patriarch. The Church calls for unity. Address by His Holiness Patriarch Kirill of Moscow and All Russia. Minsk, 2010. p. 83; Kirill (Gundyaev), Patriarch. Sermons 2009-2010. pp. 95-96.

65. Wed., for example: "The Church did not have an independent position on public and political issues and could not have, because it was part of the state apparatus" (The speech of His Holiness Patriarch Kirill at the signing ceremony of the agreement on social partnership between the Russian Orthodox Church and the Ural Federal District // Journal of the Moscow Patriarchate. 2010. N6. P. 29). See also: Alexy II (Riediger). The Church and the spiritual revival of R'ossiya / / Alexy II. Words, speeches, Messages, Appeals, 2000-2004. Moscow: Moscow Patriarchate, 2005. Vol. 3. Part 2. pp. 214, 439. Metropolitan Hilarion recalls that the restoration of the Patriarchate itself became possible only after the fall of the monarchy: Hilarion (Alfeyev), Metropolitan. The church is open to everyone. Presentations and interviews. Minsk: Belorusskaya Pravoslavnaya Tserkva, 2011, p. 166.

66. Cyril (Gundyaev), Patriarch. To be faithful to God. p. 231.

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Arch Kirill mentions "the terrible sin of apostasy of the entire nation, ... trampling on holy things, ... blasphemy and mockery of the Church, of holy things, of faith" 67, but does not mention the fall of the monarchy and the execution of the royal family.

"The people must be ready for monarchy": autocracy or democracy?

One of the conclusions of Osnovy's reading of the story of Saul is to introduce an element of popular power into the theory of Orthodox monarchy. This document states that the emergence of the state was "God's giving people the opportunity to organize their social life based on their free expression of will" (III. 1, paragraph 4). Lungin's film also shows that the final collapse of Ivan the Terrible was not divine punishment, but nonviolent resistance of his own people. The scene of the deposition of Metropolitan Philip shows the role of the church in condemning the tsar's actions in the eyes of the people; the last scene depicts the lonely tsar waiting in vain for "his people" on the royal feast.

The presence of this "democratic" element in Orthodox political theory is not at all self-evident, since it represents a departure from the canonical interpretation of royal power as a divine institution that has the source of legitimacy not in the will of the people, but in the anointing of the kingdom. The presentation of the story of Saul in the Fundamentals again gives room for ambivalent interpretation: the establishment of the monarchy was an act of divine grace to the "free will" of the people, but whether the source of power is divine grace or the will of the people is left to commentators. Nevertheless, the very political language of the " Fundamentals "("free expression of will", etc.) shows a high degree of penetration of the theory of popular sovereignty into the Orthodox political tradition. Let us once again refer to the already cited paragraph of the "Fundamentals "(III. 7, paragraph 3): "We cannot completely exclude the possibility of such a spiritual revival of society, when a religiously higher form of state organization becomes natural", but now we will focus on the concept of "revival of society". This concept is clarified by the speech of Patriarch Kirill

67. Cyril (Gundyaev), Patriarch. Sermons, p. 57.

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March 27, 2007, in which he gives his interpretation of the fall of the monarchy in 1917: "The moral state of the people no longer corresponded to the monarchical principle of state organization." In his opinion, the monarchy " requires almost one hundred percent religiosity of the people and society, we need a universal belief that the king is the anointed one." Raising the question of the possibility of a monarchy in the current religious and moral state of society in Russia, Patriarch Kirill noted that if the monarchy today "was miraculously restored and if, God forbid, the tsar made any mistake, tomatoes and rotten eggs would fly at him just as they did at Moscow."- some careless mayor " 68.

Commenting on this statement of Patriarch Kirill, Andrey Kuraev combined the " monarchical principle "with the principle of Christian asceticism," self-abasement"," kenosis", arguing that in a monarchy, subjects should be ready for unquestioning submission, since " monarchy is cutting off one's will, entrusting it to God's Providence... We must force our fingers to unclench from the fig tree into which they have grown over the years of Soviet power and democracy, into an open palm that is ready, as God's Providence, to accept everything that will be said from the throne. "69 But even today in Russia there is a" piece " of monarchy -the Moscow Patriarchate; "if our monarchists cannot impose a ban on If they take a vow to refrain from criticizing the Patriarch , how can they refrain from criticizing the monarch?"70 Thus, a good monarchist must be an Orthodox believer; leaving aside the question of whether the opposite is true, 71 Andrey Kuraev also links the monarchy with the formation of political subjectivity in the (ecclesiastical) people. Many church leaders adhere to

68. Cyril (Gundyaev), Metropolitan. Metropolitan Kirill believes that the moral state of Russian society precludes the restoration of the monarchy in the country in the near future / / Official website of the Moscow Patriarchate. March 27, 2007.

69. Kuraev A.V. The Church in the world of people. 5th ed. Moscow, 2009, p. 390.

70. Ibid., pp. 391_392.

71. Among the radical right, the answer to this question is unequivocally positive. Cf. with a quote from Metropolitan Vladimir of the Epiphany in V. Nevyarovich's book: "A priest who is not a monarchist is not worthy to stand at the Holy Cross. The Throne" (Nevyarovich V. K. Blessed is the kingdom. Church foundations of the monarchist idea in Russia, St. Petersburg, 2004, p. 21). See also Vyacheslav Klykov's statement "an Orthodox person is truly primarily a monarchist" (Klykov V. M. The True light of Monarchy / / Tomorrow. 1996. N 16 (169)).

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the same point of view that the people should be ready for a monarchy, and this readiness is expressed by the measure of ecclesiasticism. This position is supported, for example, by Archpriest Maxim Kozlov, Archpriest Vladislav Sveshnikov, Archpriest Alexander Ilyashenko, Archpriest Andrey Spiridonov, Archimandrite Platon Igumnov and others. Among these authors, we can read such statements as: "a monarchy can appear when broad strata of society are found who are ready to recognize themselves as subjects of the sovereign", "the main condition for its [monarchy] is spiritual and moral maturity and the readiness of society to accept it", " you can raise the question of monarchy only if you yourself the people will really feel that this is not violence against them, not the imposition of something alien"," if it [society] wants to declare itself as a democratic one, a traditional monarchy is impossible"," we just haven't grown up to it [the establishment of a monarchy], we haven't matured yet", etc.72. On this ground, there may be discrepancies: either the people are not yet ready for a monarchy, or, as Archpriest Vsevolod Chaplin writes, the ideal of monarchy among the people has never "been lost"73, - but, in essence, we are talking about the same thing, namely, the inclusion of elements of the theory of popular sovereignty in the very center of Orthodox discourses about monarchy.

The same "democratic" element of the concept of "reviving society" is also present in the modern "tsar-godism", but with an emphasis on nationalism. The idea of Nicholas II as a" redeemer "indirectly constructs a political subject, since the predicate "redemption" also implies a certain subject, a certain " we "who is"redeemed". The construction of the" we "becomes even more prominent in the version of" godless "that requires universal repentance for the sin of regicide, since the question is: who are the" we " who should repent? - it becomes inevitable. So the concept is

72." Monarchy is the best, ideal way of government... " Orthodox clergy on the monarchical idea / / Russkaya narodnaya liniya. March 15, 2012.

73. Vsevolod Chaplin, at a meeting with deputies of the Duma's United Russia faction in May 2010, said that "the people should mature for the monarchy", and on November 3 of the same year, at the exhibition-forum "Orthodox Russia", he called for filling the "gap in the legitimacy" of the existing system that was formed due to the revolution 1917 (Malashenko A.V., Filatov S. B. The Orthodox Church under the new Patriarch, Moscow: ROSSPEN, 2012, p. 63). Cf.with the words of Archpriest Gennady Belovolov: "Our people are by nature monarchical" (The secular constitutional monarchy for Orthodoxy is spiritually unacceptable // Russkaya narodnaya liniya. May 11, 2011).

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national repentance becomes an instrument of nationalization of political discourse 74. Although the topic of the political significance of collective repentance has not been sufficiently studied in the literature, 75 it can be stated with sufficient certainty that the rituals and rhetoric of national repentance have a great potential for forming national identity. In Russian culture, the most influential statement about the connection between nation and collective remorse was made in A. Solzhenitsyn's article" Remorse and Self-restraint as categories of national life "in 197376. It is characteristic that" remorse and self-restraint " are precisely the categories that are most applicable to modern discourses on the restoration of the monarchy: repentance for the sin of regicide and the "monarchical kenosis" mentioned above by Andrey Kuraev.

Slavophil ideology of autocracy

This is not to say that the" democratic " element has only recently entered the monarchist ideology. On the contrary, the highest achievements of the Orthodox theology of power are connected with the search for a political subject in the 19th and early 20th centuries, primarily in the Slavophil tradition, in which autocracy was important insofar as it was a symptom of the high spiritual status of the people.77 For the classical Slavophiles, the idea of autocracy did not exclude, but assumed, an element of narodopravstvo in accordance with the sacramental formula "to the people - an opinion, to the tsar-a decision" 78.-

74. Cf.: "Each of us is burdened with the mortal sin of regicide... The first and most important thing in this repentance is the awareness of oneself as one of the particles of the Russian people" (Nevyarovich V. K. Blessed is the Kingdom. p. 262.)

75. Например: Celermajer, D. (2009) The Sins of the Nation and the Ritual of Apologies. New York: Cambridge University Press.

76. Solzhenitsyn A. I. Remorse and self-restraint as categories of national life [1973] / / Solzhenitsyn A. I. Publicistics, Vol. 1. Yaroslavl, 1995, p. 49_86.

77. D-H. [Dmitry Khomyakov]. Autocracy, Moscow, 1903 [1899]. P. 40. Cf. with the statement of Konstantin Aksakov: "We used to have self-appointed tsars, but there was no impostor - there was no peace "(cited in: Slavophilism and Westernism: Conservative and Liberal Utopia in the works of Andrzej Walicki. Issue 2. Moscow: INION Publ., 1991, p. 82).

78. The penetration of Slavophil rhetoric into the church environment is evidenced, for example, by a 1907 note by Archbishop Andronik (Nikolsky) of Perm:"...An autocracy created in history by the people themselves, and based on the complete unity of the Tsar with the people, the constant expression of which was

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yes was opposed to the bureaucratic power of absolute monarchies, the despotic power of one person, and parliamentary democracy.

The theological ideas of classical Slavophilism had an exceptionally strong impact on the intellectual climate of the late Imperial and emigrant period of socio-philosophical and theological debates and continue to be heard in modern discussions. Central to Slavophil ideology are the concept of the Zemsky Sobor, the idea that the Romanov dynasty was enthroned by popular will through the Zemsky Sobor of 1613. 79 Later, Slavophilism tried to develop more concrete and legally workable forms of" people's monarchy", in which the people owned not only" opinion", but also, to a certain extent,"decision". We are talking about the concept of combining autocracy and local people's self-government; the publicist Sergei Sharapov (1855-1911) developed the most complete theory of such a state structure.

One of the fundamental foundations of the Neo-Slavophile theory was the concept of legal autocracy, which consisted in the fact that, unlike despotism, Russian autocracy presupposes strict observance of the law. In their opinion, the fact that the source of legislative power is the will of an unlimited monarch does not mean that subjects should tolerate arbitrariness and lawlessness; 80 First, as the legal theorists of tsarist Russia have argued, the laws adopted by the monarch are also binding on him (of course, as long as he is a sovereign). second, the legislative process itself is also natural and follows a certain, rather complex procedure, and is not performed spontaneously at the whim of the monarch.81
zemstvo councils, called by the Tsar according to custom to consult with the land, to listen to its will. This was our unwritten constitution, according to which neither the Tsar without the people, nor the people without the Tsar: from the land - advice and will, and from the Tsar - decision and power" (Andronik (Nikolsky), Archbishop. Creations: Articles and notes. Tver, 2004. Book 1, p. 359).

79. For example: Koshelev A. I. Constitution, autocracy and Zemstvo Duma. Leipzig, 1862; Sharapov S. F. [Editorial article] / / Russkoe delo. 1907. N 1. pp. 1-4.

80. Vasiliev A.V. Tasks and aspirations of Slavophilism. St. Petersburg, 1883; Vasiliev A.V. [Editorial article] / / Blagovest. 1890. N 3. P. 70.

81. Korkunov N. M. Russkoe gosudarstvennoe pravo [Russian State Law], 2 vols. SPb., 1892-1893, vol. 1, pp. 217-219.

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The second and most important prerequisite of the neo-Slavophil analysis is the recognition of the people's legal capacity, that is, the ability and ability of the people to actively participate in political life and make state-important decisions. Sharapov tried to reconcile this premise with the concept of unlimited power of the tsar, developing the concept of two sources of power - autocracy and self-government. In his opinion, the power of the autocrat has a divine source and is therefore indivisible and non-transferable; in other words, it is ridiculous and blasphemous to think that the tsar can delegate part of his divine power to a minister, and the minister to the head of a department, and so on down to the district policeman. Thus, in the state only the tsar has full power, but what about if we are talking about such a colossal and populous state as Russia? The tsar cannot delve into every small matter that occurs in the provinces, but he cannot delegate his power to solve it "on the ground". This means that there must also be a second source of power - the people, who can delegate the decision of their local affairs through the electoral system at the level of the parish, county and further up to the central ministries.82 In practice, this means that the tsarist prerogative concerns the most important state affairs, such as war and peace, the army and navy, railways and finances, as well as control, while the people's representatives are primarily responsible for local affairs: education, police, road construction, etc.

In 1905, Lev Tikhomirov's voluminous work "Monarchical Statehood"83 appeared, in which the possibility and desirability of autocracy were based on the most basic, psychological level. The author argued that the monarchy is psychologically very close to a person, since it embodies the power of the moral principle-common to all people-over the formal legal and bureaucratic process. Such a pony-

82. Sharapov S. F. Opyt russkoi politicheskoi programmy [The experience of the Russian Political Program], Moscow, 1905; Sharapov S. F. Po polveka [Through half a century], Moscow, 1902.

83. Written in rather heavy language, this book did not become a bestseller in monarchical circles. The role of a popularizer of Tikhomirov's ideas was assumed by Archpriest Ioann Rapturous, who published in 1911, based on the "Monarchical Statehood", his work "Monarchical Catechism" (I. I. Rapturous Monarchical Catechism / / Ioann Rapturous, prot. Complete Works in 5 vols. St. Petersburg: Tsarskoe Delo, 1995. Vol. 4).

84. See, for example: "Personal rights are more effectively guaranteed by the monarchical supreme power... This conclusion is explained by the fact that the monarchy... it is created exactly

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mania can be thought of in the context of natural law theory. In the spirit of Tomism, Tikhomirov reduced natural law to divine law: if people were perfect, then their natural law would completely coincide with divine law, but after the fall, there was a need for positive law, which can be very different from divine law. The essence of monarchy in this case is to restore the unity of divine and natural law and to overcome the dominance of positive law. At the institutional level, Tikhomirov rejected the concept of "symphony" and criticized the Byzantine tradition of subordinating the church to state interests; he argued that the tsar and the church should be united on a different, more fundamental level, on the level of the human person. At this level, the role of the church is to inculcate religious morality, and the role of the tsar is to express the people's moral ideals in political decisions.85
In the works of Tikhomirov, the final crystallization of the concept of "people's monarchy" takes place, since, unlike the theories of the Slavophiles, he does not completely exclude the divinity of royal power, interprets it very narrowly and ultimately reduces it to the people's will.86 The idea that the tsar expresses the moral ideal of the people returns to the church the key role of guarantor of morality and religious salvation, which was taken away from it in medieval theology by the sacred authority of the tsar. That is why this particular interpretation was supported in post-Soviet political theology, having been previously circumscribed by intellectuals of the religious and philosophical renaissance of the early 20th century and in emigration. Thus, N. A. Berdyaev wrote that under the autocracy, " the tsar and the people are bound together by the same faith, the same submission to the Church and God's truth. Autocracy presupposes a broad popular social base-

and only the ethical beginning" (Vereshchagin V. Yu., Makeev V. V., Ponezhin M. Yu. The doctrine of monarchical statehood by L. A. Tikhomirov. Rostov-on-Don, 2003, p. 56). Tikhomirov's ideas were taken up by Ivan Ilyin. Cf.: "A real monarchy is feasible only in the order of internal spiritual and spiritual activity. It brings to politics the beginning of intimacy, loyalty, warmth and heartfelt pathos" (Ilyin I. A. On the monarchy and the Republic. New York: Sodruzhestvo Publ., 1979, p. 506).

85. Tikhomirov L. A. Monarchicheskaia gosudarstvennost ' [Monarchical statehood]. 4 ch. Moscow, 1905. Ch. 4.

86. Which in the end is not surprising for the former narodovolets.

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zis " 87. A special interpretation in this period was given to the rite of the wedding to the kingdom and chrismation. Sergei Bulgakov, for example, noted that through it "a special, sacred and erotic connection with the people is established." 88 The metaphor of the state as a family, brought back to the surface of political discourse by Osnovy (III. 1, paragraph 2), has a special meaning for the monarchical consciousness, in which the image of the tsar merges with the image of the tsar. "husband", and the wedding to the kingdom - with the sacrament of the wedding of spouses 89.

In this intellectual tradition, which dominated church discussions at the turn of the 19th and 20th centuries, the idea of the supernatural, the divinity of royal power is combined with the concept of popular sovereignty. The inorganic nature of this combination was noticed by contemporaries. Vladimir Solovyov, followed by Pavel Florensky and Sergey Bulgakov, criticized the ideas of the Slavophiles and, in particular, Alexey Khomyakov for being too committed to "democracy" .90 In 1917, Sergei Bulgakov decried the" temptation of democracy "in Orthodox thought, implying precisely Slavophilism and narodism, with their tendency to deify the people and the popular faith in the" father tsar " and to confuse the sacred and profane.91 Bulgakov noted that the Orthodox Church is the church of ordinary people, the people's church, so the temptation of democracy is especially strong for it compared to other Christian churches.

Despite this criticism, the further "mainline" development of Orthodox political thought was mainly associated with the Slavophil and narodnik traditions. A special influence on the modern understanding of the monarchy, including in church circles, was exerted by the works of Ivan Ilyin, who proposed a kind of synthesis of the neo-Slavophil " national self-

87. Berdyaev N. A. The Kingdom of God and the kingdom of Caesar. 1925. N 1. pp. 33-34.

88. Bulgakov S. N. Svet nevecherniy, Moscow: Respublika Publ., 1994 [1917]. P. 340. Cf. with the statement of Archpriest I. Razvorgov: "Here [in the anointing of myrrh] the God-crowned Tsar enters into a sacred and mysterious union with his people" (Razvorgov I. The meaning of the royal coronation / / Kovalevsky V. (ed.) On tsarist power, p. 31).

89. John (Snychev), Metropolitan. Autocracy of the Spirit, Moscow, 2012, p. 494.

90. Florensky P. About Khomyakov [kdz] / / Florensky P. Collected works in 4 volumes, Moscow, 1996. Vol. 2. See about it: K. Paromov "Near Khomyakov" by O. P. A. Florensky and the older Slavophiles: In an attempt to identify the peculiarity of the royal power // Bulletin of PSTSU. History. 2011. N 1 (38). pp. 23-48.

91. Bulgakov S. Tserkva i demokratiya [The Church and Democracy]. Svoboda v Tserkvi? From Fiction to Truth, Moscow, 2009, p. 30.

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Derzhavin" and Tikhomirov's "natural law" with an emphasis on the latter. In particular, the idea that the level of popular legal awareness determines the form of state government is indicative of Tikhomirov's motives.92 It is precisely Ilyin's formulation that "the restoration of the monarchy... It is unthinkable without a simultaneous spiritual revival" of the Russian people, migrated to the books of Metropolitan John (Snychev) and other monarchists of our days 93. Another source of inspiration for modern monarchists is the work of Ivan Solonevich "People's Monarchy" (1973), which largely continued the Slavophil tradition of nationalization of the theory of monarchy. In this theory, the monarch is needed so that "the personal fate of the individual is fused into one whole with the fate of the nation." 94
Conclusion

Above, we have considered two main sources of theorizing about the monarchy: the medieval concept of "tsarism" and the Slavophil modernization project to introduce elements of the theory of popular sovereignty into the understanding of the monarchy. Although both traditions co-exist in modern Russia, their proportions and the nature of interaction have changed in the direction of marginalizing "tsarebozhie". Having accepted the "Basics", the top of the Russian Orthodox Church made a decisive choice in favor of the Slavophil interpretation. First, the divinity of power in general and of the royal power in particular was excluded. Secondly, the monarchy was recognized as a lower form of government compared to"judging". Third, and most importantly, the question of the monarchy was transferred to the socio-ethical plane; the monarchy was recognized as morally more beneficial for the people and its restoration was allowed on condition of " spiritualizing society." Thus, the "people" was recognized as a political entity, the main beneficiary of the monarchy, its foundation.

Thus, even dreaming of pre-Petrine Russia and the "symphony" that supposedly existed in the XV, XVI or XVII centuries, modern Orthodox intellectuals-monarchists are revived.-

92. See, for example: I. Zernov. Ivan Ilyin. Monarchy and the Future of Russia, Moscow, 2007, p. 12.

93. St. John (Snychev), Metropolitan. Autocracy and Russia / / Kovalevsky V. (ed.) On tsarist power, p. 102.

94. Solonevich I. Narodnaya monarkhiya [People's Monarchy], Moscow, 1991, p. 89.

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They do not use the concept of theological "tsarism" that existed at that time, but rather concepts characteristic of the final stage of the Russian monarchical tradition - for the turn of the XIX-XX centuries. The intellectual efforts expended by the neo-Slavophiles and conservative monarchists of the late Imperial period were aimed at justifying and justifying the already shaken and "morally obsolete" monarchy, so they were necessarily contradictory. The attempt to reconcile the historically dying tradition of" tsarism " and the concept of national self-government was not successful then, in the pre-revolutionary years, and cannot be logically consistent today. In other words, monarchism cannot maintain itself at the stage of Slavophil conceptual confusion, and its supporters are forced to take either a step "back", to "tsarism", and therefore to political marginality, or "forward", to a nationalist interpretation of the monarchy.

In the traditional Russian Orthodox monarchy, whose socio-political characteristics could be described by the term "empire", i.e."composite community" 95, the community of subjects of the tsar was amorphous, heterogeneous, with very weak - if any - internal ties. Despite some attempts at "Russification" in the late 19th and early 20th centuries ,the " nation "did not act as a political goal and self-sufficient subject, but rather served as a condition of loyalty to the autocracy (as in the theory of" official nationality " by S. S. Uvarov). In modern conditions, the community of subjects of the virtual tsar is imagined with fundamentally different characteristics - as a homogeneous, tightly knit "people", bound together by the" staples "of Russian" national " affiliation and Orthodox faith. The monarchy is presented not as a cause, but as a consequence of the existence of such a people. It is important to emphasize that the territorial framework of the" Orthodox people "goes beyond the existing Russian Federation and is conceptualized by the concepts of the "Russian World" and "Holy Russia", thereby giving the imaginary Russian monarchy a potentially irredentist dimension.

95. For example, the Ab Imperio journal staff defines the subject of their research: Research on the new Imperial history and nationalism in the post-Soviet space.

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The monarchy in its" non-autocratic", constitutional sense can come just "to court" in modern, national-colored political debates as another tool for rallying the "nation", and as an important element of the new political language of the Russian Orthodox Church. Thus, the debate about monarchy is a kind of intellectual testing ground for the church, where the applicability of various traditions of political theology is tested and a new construction is developed that would emphasize the ideological independence of the church, would be theologically meaningful and at the same time practically applicable as a program of political action.

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