The main and main feature of the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945, unlike all previous wars, is that this war was an armed clash of victorious socialism with the shock forces of imperialism - German fascism and Japanese militarism. The victory of socialism in the U.S.S.R., which defined a new qualitative state of Soviet society, ensured the unprecedented unity of the people, their unity, and their unwavering determination to defend their socialist gains, their freedom and independence. The war was truly national, patriotic, and the most just of all wars in the history of mankind. This new content of the war determined the nature and scope of the partisan movement in the occupied territory. The partisan movement behind enemy lines, which became the most important component of the Great Patriotic War, was radically different in its political content and character, in an unprecedented scale from all the partisan movements of the past, both in Russia and in other countries that were subjected to foreign invasion, from the Resistance movement in Europe and Asia during the Second World War.

The political and scientific significance of the experience of the Soviet partisan movement is determined by the nationwide character of this movement, its role and place in the general struggle of the working people of the U.S.S.R. against Hitlerite aggression, by the intensification of the struggle between the forces of socialism and imperialism, between democracy and reaction. Therefore, a comprehensive and in-depth study of the struggle of the Soviet people, led by the Communist Party, against imperialist aggression, and an integral part of this struggle-the partisan movement-is the most important task of historical science, an indispensable condition for further improving all our ideological activities and educating the Soviet people in the spirit of the heroic traditions of defending the Soviet Motherland. 1

* The article is based on the author's report at the All - Union Scientific Conference "The Communist Party-organizer of the victory of the Soviet people in the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945", held in December 1970 in Volgograd.

1 Important issues of the historiography of the partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War are considered in the works of: A. A. Kurnosov. The struggle of Soviet people in the rear of the German-fascist invaders (Historiography of the issue). "History and Historians". Collection of articles, Moscow, 1965; A. A. Kurnosov and E. S. Lagutin. Partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War and bourgeois historiography. "History of the USSR" No. 3, 1960; A. M. Samsonov, A. A. Kurnosov. To study the history of the struggle of the Soviet people in the temporarily occupied territory of the USSR by the Nazi invaders. Voprosy istorii, 1964, No. 12; T. A. Logu-

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The founders of Marxism-Leninism paid great attention to the development of problems of guerrilla warfare. Engels revealed the role of partisan warfare in the struggle of peoples for their liberation. V. I. Lenin, relying mainly on subsequent experience, on the activities of the party of the advanced class - the party of the proletariat, enriched the most important propositions of K. Marx and F. Kropotkin. Engels on the partisan war. In the preface to the work "Partisan War" V. I. Lenin wrote:: "The question of partisan actions greatly interests our party and the working masses." In this regard, he expressed his intention not only to continue developing it, but also to give a more complete presentation of Marxist views on this issue. 2 V. I. Lenin's works are the most important methodological basis for studying various aspects of the partisan movement. All their provisions are politically relevant, vital, and of great practical importance. It was Lenin's ideas and instructions that formed the basis for the development of practical measures of the Communist Party, the basis of all its activities for the deployment of a national war in the territory occupied by the enemy during the Great Patriotic War.

This should be emphasized because there are repeated attempts to attribute the development of the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare to Mao Tse-tung. C. Dixon and O. Heilbrunn claim that " the Soviet Union put into practice the plan of guerrilla warfare developed in 1937 by the then unknown Chinese Communist Mao Tse-tung." The West German military historian G. Gottberg fully agrees with the English authors .3
V. I. Lenin pointed out that the main content and feature of guerrilla warfare is its popular character. Without the full support of the population, there can be no successful guerrilla war. In the people - its strength. A partisan movement cannot be planted artificially, outside and against the wishes of the people. The masses of the people must be convinced of the necessity of partisan actions and be ready to participate in them. Emphasizing this, V. I. Lenin wrote that "the need to take into account the mood of the broad masses in organizing partisan actions is beyond doubt." 4 Any partisan war, any partisan actions that are not connected with the people, that are not supported by them, are doomed, as V. I. Lenin pointed out, to failure. This most important methodological position makes it possible to draw a watershed between two approaches to the development of the history of the partisan movement, to explain its sources, and to correctly understand the role and significance of partisan means of struggle in World War II.

If Soviet historians, and they are unanimous in this, see the source of the partisan movement in the Soviet territory temporarily occupied by the enemy, its effective strength and scope were not equal to that of the Soviet Union.-

nova. Soviet historiography of the party underground and partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War. "Essays on the historiography of the Soviet society", Moscow, 1967; V. G. Eremin, A. F. Yudenkov. Party leadership of the national struggle in the Soviet territory occupied by the enemy (1941-1944). "Questions of the history of the CPSU" No. 3, 1969.

2 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 14, p. 1.

3 Ch. Dixon, O. Heilbrunn. Communist Partisan Actions, Moscow, 1957, p. 30; H. L. von Gottberg. Das Wessen des sowjetischen Partisanenkampfes. "Wehrkunde", 1958, N 12, S. 691.

4 V. I. Lenin. PSS. T. 13, p. 365.

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The Soviet partisan movement in the Soviet Union is considered by the representatives of the bourgeois historical school, including well - known Hitlerite generals, "researchers" from various anti - Soviet institutions and centers, and Western reactionary historians to be the most important factor in the victory of socialism, the leadership of the Communist Party, the political unity of society , socialist patriotism, and the friendship of peoples. 5 It was a derivative of the" mistakes " of the rulers of Hitler's Germany in carrying out the occupation policy that the establishment of a terrorist regime in the occupied territory was the main reason for such a powerful partisan movement. With a more "sensible" policy, they argue, it would all come down to a few minor "incidents." 6 Of course, it cannot be denied that the atrocities and mass extermination of Soviet people carried out by the invaders could not but strengthen the aspirations of the Soviet people to fight against fascism. But all this was only an additional factor in the emergence and development of guerrilla warfare. The partisan movement, as V. I. Lenin pointed out, is caused by specific conditions, "powerful economic and political reasons."7 The popular defense of the socialist gains against German imperialism was what caused the partisan movement in the Soviet territory temporarily occupied by the enemy.

These are two opposing and irreconcilable ideological concepts in explaining the origins and strength of the partisan struggle in the USSR during the Great Patriotic War. Methodological analysis of the nature of the partisan movement is a mandatory requirement for all works dealing with general aspects of partisan struggle in World War II. Lenin's approach to explaining the sources of partisan warfare makes it possible not only to reveal the full grandeur of the Soviet partisan movement, but also to explain why attempts to use partisan means for anti-national purposes, artificially, against the will of the people, instill a partisan war, failed.

It is known that the rulers of fascist Germany, when there was a direct threat of transferring military operations to German territory, began to prepare (including under the influence of the effectiveness of the partisan movement in the USSR) for their own partisan war, hoping to use partisan means of struggle against the armies of the anti-Hitler coalition, and above all against the Red Army. To this end, they decided to create a special organization known as" Werewolf "("Werewolf"). Its leadership was entrusted to the ardent Nazi Prutzmann, who previously headed the Waffen-Ss and the police in Ukraine. At the disposal of the "Werewolf" were provided with huge funds, large bases were created, mainly in the mountainous regions of Germany. For the deployment of guerrilla warfare, special armed formations, combat groups and organizations were created, and the "Werewolf" had the necessary time to organize a guerrilla war. However, the rulers of Hitler's Germany, who pursued aggressive forces in the war, are a misanthropist-

5 Historians of socialist countries also hold the same positions. See, for example, H. Kühnrich. Der Partisanenkrieg in Europa. 1939 - 1945. B. 1965.

6 This thesis is especially strongly proved by the American historian A. Dallin (A. Dallin. German Rule in Russia. 1941 -1945. L. 1957), the above-mentioned G. Gottberg (H. L. von Gottberg. Op. cit.); an officer of bourgeois Latvia, from the moment of the attack on the USSR by fascist Germany-the commander of punitive units and units, and after its defeat - the" researcher " of the partisan movement V. Redelis (V. Redelis. Partisanenkrieg. Heidelberg. 1958), another punisher and "researcher" - N. Galai (N. Gal). The partisan fores. "The Soviet Army", L. 1957), etc.

7 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 14, p. 7.

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They were unable to develop a partisan struggle against the Red Army and the troops of other members of the anti-Hitler coalition. This plan failed completely. The anti-national nature of the goals of the partisan struggle that the fascist bosses wanted to unleash fundamentally undermined the very possibility of its deployment.

At the call of the Communist Party, from the very first days of the war, along with military operations on the fronts where the Red Army opposed Hitler's hordes, the Soviet people launched a powerful partisan movement in the rear of enemy troops, widely resorting to partisan forms and methods of struggle. It is necessary, the Central Committee of the Party pointed out in its resolution of July 18, 1941, "to create unbearable conditions for the German interventionists, to disorganize their communications, transport, and military units themselves, and to disrupt all their activities." 8 The socialist state made full use of the enormous possibilities of partisan struggle to achieve victory over the strongest army in the capitalist world, which was then Hitler's Wehrmacht. 9 The actions of the Red Army at the front merged with the actions of the partisans in one common blow of the Soviet people against the Hitlerite aggressors. "Together with the Soviet Armed Forces," says the Central Committee of the CPSU Theses dedicated to the 50th anniversary of the Great October Revolution, "the partisans delivered crushing blows to the enemy." 10
Unlike the partisan activities of the past, the Soviet partisan movement was for the first time in the history of wars controlled and centralized. The creation of the Central Headquarters of the Partisan Movement (TSHPD) at the Headquarters of the Supreme Command of the Soviet Troops, republican and regional headquarters, representative offices of the corresponding headquarters at the military councils of fronts and armies - all this represented a system of organizing the leadership of partisan actions that the history of armies and wars has not yet known. This system made it possible to direct the partisan movement in accordance with the strategic tasks solved by the Red Army. "From the experience of my work in the General Staff," writes Marshal of the Soviet Union A. M. Vasilevsky, " I can state with full justification that the partisan movement and the struggle of the people behind enemy lines played an important role in the overall strategic plans and calculations of the Soviet Supreme High Command and were taken into account in the development of major offensive operations conducted on Soviet territory " 11 . The actions of the partisans were so organically intertwined with the operations of the Red Army, so closely connected with the tasks of the fronts and armies, and played such a large role, especially during the offensive, that in a certain sense it is possible to call the partisan forces a peculiar kind or at least a kind of Soviet Armed Forces. In no war did partisan actions have the effect of

8 " The Communist Party during the Great Patriotic War (June 1941-1945)". Documents " materials, Moscow, 1961, p. 537.

9 Of course, the Soviet partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War was not the main form of struggle of the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders. To resist the regular, well-equipped military equipment and weapons of the troops of Hitler's Germany could only be regular, not inferior in anything, but, on the contrary, superior in everything to their armed forces, which was the Red Army. But the partisan movement that developed in the Soviet territory temporarily occupied by the enemy greatly contributed to the Red Army's defeat of Hitler's Wehrmacht.

10 "50 years of the Great October Socialist Revolution". Resolution of the Plenum of the Central Committee of the CPSU. Theses of the Central Committee of the CPSU, Moscow, 1967, pp. 21-22.

11 A. Vasilevsky. Short encyclopedia of the Great Patriotic War. Kommunist, 1970, No. 8, p. 112.

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The Soviet partisan movement did not contribute as much to the defeat of the enemy as it did to the regular army.

The rulers of Hitler's Germany, its military command, which based its plan of war against the USSR - the Barbarossa plan - on the "blitzkrieg" doctrine, considered the suppression of possible partisan actions as a side event that did not deserve the attention of the Wehrmacht. But already on July 23, 1941, the General Staff of the German Land Forces, preparing a report to Hitler, was forced to admit that the German-Fascist troops were faced with a factor not provided for in the war plan - a partisan movement. In mid-September 1941, in the third month of the war, the Supreme High Command of the German Armed Forces was alarmed to note the growth of a powerful partisan movement in the occupied Soviet territory. The Supreme Command of the German Armed Forces was forced to note the mass nature of the partisan struggle in the occupied Soviet territory, the variety of its forms, and the centralized leadership. All these moments were a new phenomenon in the partisan movement. "With the outbreak of war against Soviet Russia in the territories occupied by Germany," Keitel's order of September 16, 1941 stated, " a communist insurgency broke out everywhere, with forms of action ranging from propaganda activities and attacks on individual members of the Wehrmacht to open uprisings and widespread warfare." The Hitler command saw a huge danger in the unfolding partisan war in mass sabotage. The order emphasized that it was "a mass movement centrally directed from Moscow." And this led to the very significant conclusion that "an ever-increasing threat to the German leadership of the war is emerging" 12, that is, plans for the military defeat of the Soviet Union are being thwarted.

The partisan movement in the Soviet territory temporarily occupied by the enemy, being a new strategic factor in the war, which the Hitlerite command did not have to meet in all previous wars of conquest in Europe, required it to attract significant forces, which, of course, was not previously envisaged. Since the end of the summer of 1941, the Wehrmacht has been actively involved in the struggle against the Soviet partisan movement, along with purely punitive bodies and their armed forces. In October 1941, the commander-in-Chief of the land army of Hitler's Germany, Brauchitsch, approved a special instruction "Basic provisions for combating partisans". Now the Hitlerite command, when planning offensive operations against the Red Army, began to provide, in addition to systematic punitive actions, additional special measures against the partisan movement. During the planning of the Moscow operation, which was codenamed Typhoon and was the culmination of the entire initial period of the war, the German command had already provided for measures aimed at suppressing partisans in the rear of Army Group Center13. Based on all this, as well as from the analysis of the military operations of 1941, we can say with good reason that one of the most important elements that led to the collapse of the enemy "blitzkrieg" was the partisan movement that unfolded in the rear of Hitler's troops. The failure of the "lightning war" meant that new factors were coming into play, including

12 " Top secret! Only for command!". The strategy of fascist Germany in the war against the USSR. Documents and Materials, Moscow, 1967, pp. 395-396.

13 T. P. Lesnyak. From the history of the partisan movement. "An unprecedented feat", Moscow, 1968, p. 445.

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including such as the continuously growing partisan movement. Hitler's command faced the prospect of a prolonged war. Therefore, after the collapse of the "blitzkrieg", along with the development of new measures designed for a long war-economic, military, ideological-it also outlines measures to combat the Soviet partisans.

Since the summer of 1942, the leadership of the struggle against the partisans, as well as the leadership of the troops at the front, has been concentrated in the hands of the general Staff of the Wehrmacht. "In the Main Command of the Land Forces, the operational management of the General Staff is henceforth responsible for the management of all issues of the fight against partisans and the use of security units," says one of the orders for the Hitlerite army. " 14 The struggle against the Soviet partisan movement became an integral part of the war waged by Hitler's Germany against the USSR. The share of enemy army units and formations engaged in direct combat with partisans, to protect communications from them, is constantly growing. In 1943, Hitler's command concentrated against the partisans, in addition to numerous punitive bodies, formations and units of the SS and SD, half a million auxiliary troops and 25 divisions of the active army - about a tenth of the total personnel who fought on the Soviet-German front. Analyzing the strategic position of Nazi Germany in November 1943 and the forces opposing it, Chief of Staff of the operational leadership of the German Armed Forces Jodl, along with describing the state of the Red Army, its tank, air, and artillery power, pays great attention to the Soviet partisan movement. The actions of the partisans, especially on communications, Jodl noted, "had a very negative impact on the conduct of the operation." 15
During the war, the Soviet partisans inflicted huge damage on the enemy, especially on its communications. They carried out more than 18,000 acts of sabotage on the railways, destroyed, wounded, and captured 1.5 million Hitlerite soldiers, officers, officials of the occupation apparatus, and their accomplices .16 Thus, the Soviet partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War not only differed in its political content from all previous partisan movements, but also in its role in defeating the regular army, in this case the Wehrmacht, had no equal in history .17 All this, taken together, determines the requirements for covering the history of the Soviet partisan movement, determines the role and place of this topic in our historical literature about the Great Patriotic War .18
14 "The fascist executioner - to answer". Documents on Adolf Heusinger's crimes against Peace, War Crimes and Crimes against Humanity, Moscow, 1962, p. 127.

15 " Top secret! Command only!", p. 545.

16 "The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945", Vol. 6, Moscow, 1965, p. 281.

17 Largely influenced by the enormous role played by the Soviet partisan movement in the last war, the Pentagon leaders developed the modern concept of "anti-partisan warfare", which the American military devotes a lot of effort and resources to the theoretical development and practical application (in particular in Indochina and Latin America).

18 Recently, a significant number of documentary collections have been published, which include documents on the partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War: "Partisan struggle against the German-fascist invaders on the territory of the Smolensk region (1941-1943)". Smolensk. 1962; " Exploits of people's avengers. Partisan movement of the Kalinin region (1941-1944)", Moscow, 1966; " National partisan movement in Belarus during the Great Patriotic War. (June 1941-July 1944)". Vol. I (until November 1942). Minsk. 1967; "The Unconquered Land of Pskov", L. 1969; "Partisans of the Bryansk region". Tula. 1970, et al.

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Of course, there is a different nature of research - historical-party, military-historical, historical, etc. - obliges to approach the problems of the partisan movement in the Great Patriotic War from appropriate aspects. But one thing is certain - the issues of the partisan movement should be considered in all works covering the struggle of the Soviet people against the Hitlerite army, and, undoubtedly, occupy a place in them corresponding to the role played by the partisan movement in the defense of the socialist state from fascist aggression.

A significant place was occupied by the coverage of the partisan movement in the multi-volume "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945" 19, as well as in the one-volume book written on its basis 20 and in a short popular science essay prepared by the Institute of Military History 21 . In this multi-volume work, many of the most important issues of the partisan movement were considered for the first time: the role and place of the partisan movement in the general struggle of the Soviet people against the German-fascist invaders was revealed, the activities of the Central Committee of the party in leading the national struggle in the territory captured by the enemy, the influence of the partisan movement on the military and political situation, including on the fronts, and the significance of the struggle against occupation forces in cities and other localities, many aspects of the partisans ' interaction with the Red Army, and so on.

The partisan movement is also covered in essays on the history of the Communist Parties of Ukraine and Belarus, as well as essays on the history of the Leningrad, Orel, Smolensk and other party organizations that had to operate under the difficult conditions of Hitler's occupation .22 These works also deal for the first time with many issues of the party leadership of the partisan movement, the activities of underground party organizations. The partisan Movement has its proper place in the works of the institutes of party history devoted to the Great Patriotic War. Moreover, some of these publications cover such issues of partisan struggle that should be considered not only in historical and party studies, but also in general historical and military-historical studies of the Great Patriotic War. Considerable attention is paid to the partisan movement in Ukraine in the three-volume book prepared by the Institute of Party History of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of Ukraine and devoted to the history of the Ukrainian SSR during the Great Patriotic War. 23 In this work, many heroic pages of the activities of the Ukrainian partisans are restored, and the struggle of the working class and all working people against the invaders in the largest industrial areas of the republic is widely shown. New and interesting material about the partisans is contained in the monograph "On the Defense of the Neva Stronghold", created at the Institute of Party History of the Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU24.

19 "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945". Tt. 1-6. Moscow, 1963-1965.

20 "The Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945". A brief history. 2nd ed., ispr. and dop. M. 1970.

21 "The Great Patriotic War". Short Popular Science Essay, Moscow, 1970.

22 "Essay on the History of the Communist Party of Belarus", Part II (1921-1966). Minsk. 1967; "Essays on the history of the Bryansk organization of the CPSU". Tula. 1968; "Essays on the History of the Communist Party of Ukraine". Kiev, 1964; "Essays on the History of the Leningrad Organization of the CPSU", Part II, L. 1969; "Essays on the history of the Orel Organization of the CPSU". Tula. 1967; "Essays on the history of the Smolensk Organization of the CPSU", Moscow 1970, et al.

23 "Украiнська РСР у Великiй Вiтчизняний Вiйнi Радянського Союзу 1941 - 1945 pp.". В трьох томах. Киiв. 1967 - 19'70.

24 S. P. Knyazev, M. P. Streshinsky, I. M. Frantishev, P. R. Sheverdalkin, Yu. N. Yablochkin. On the protection of the Neva fortress. Leningrad Party Organization during the Great Patriotic War, Leningrad, 1965.

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But in some major military-historical works, the partisan movement is sometimes underestimated, and the huge contribution that the partisans made to the defeat of the Nazi troops is not fully revealed. Showing the partisan movement at a particular stage of the war is very often reduced to describing individual heroic episodes, mentioning individual detachments or brigades, and using non-binding general wording. The main thing is not revealed: the partisan movement as a strategic factor, which was a fundamentally new phenomenon in the history of wars. Because of its importance, the Soviet partisan movement gave new features to the Soviet military art as a whole. Some works do not show the specific contribution of partisans to the overall struggle at a particular stage of the war, the interaction of partisans with fronts and armies, especially in offensive operations, when, by violating the rear lines of the German-Fascist troops, they significantly reduced their combat effectiveness, and at some points decisively hindered the approach of enemy operational reserves.

From such a book as"The General Staff during the War" 25 by S. M. Shtemenko, we would like to learn, for example, how the General Staff, when assessing the situation of the belligerents, when planning offensive operations, took into account the partisan movement as a strategic factor, especially since the activities of the General Staff proceeded in close contact with the TSHPD and both of them They were subordinate to the Headquarters of the Supreme High Command.

The role of partisans in thwarting enemy plans to capture Leningrad in the summer of 1941, and in particular in the multi-day pause in the actions of Hitler's troops when they reached the approaches to Luga and Kingisepp, is not sufficiently reflected in military-historical works. This pause allowed, as is known, to significantly strengthen the defense of Leningrad, to form new divisions and replenish those that had been thinned out in the battles. A major role in delaying the enemy offensive was played by partisan units and units formed in Leningrad. Their action plan was developed and implemented by the military councils and staffs of the North-Western direction, the Northern and North-Western Fronts, K. E. Voroshilov, A. A. Zhdanov, M. M. Popov, A. A. Kuznetsov, T. F. Shtykov, N. F. Vatutin and other military and political leaders .26 At the end of July, in accordance with the general tasks of the Soviet troops stationed in the North-west direction, the first massive attack on the rear of Army Group North was delivered by units of six partisan regiments formed for this purpose in Leningrad, totaling 6 thousand people. Then, a few days later, in accordance with the plan developed by the Northern Front headquarters and the Leningrad City Party Committee, 27 Leningrad urban partisan detachments-more than 1,500 men - struck the rear of the 4th Tank Group, the main shock force of the fascist troops advancing on Leningrad - in the Luzhsky and Kingisepp directions .27 These strikes were also supported by the so-called local partisan detachments that operated in the region. The results of the actions of the Leningrad partisans are evidenced by the documents of the Nazis. In the military diary of the Wehrmacht high Command, as early as July 29, 1941, it was noted: "In the rear of the 4th Panzer Group, there is a systematic activity of partisan forces, pre-occupation forces, etc.-

25 S. M. Shtemenko. General Staff during the War, Moscow, 1968.

26 Leningrad Party Archive, f. O-116, op. 1, 676, ll. 2-8.

27 S. P. Knyazev, M. P. Streshinsky, I. M. Frantishev, P. R. Sheverdalkin, Yu. N. Yablochkin. Op. ed., p. 108.

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disrupting traffic on roads " 28 . According to the Nazis, as early as August 3, Soviet partisans controlled almost the entire area in the rear of the 4th panzer group. At times, the supply of ammunition and fuel was almost completely stopped. In order to deliver them, well-guarded transport columns were equipped. Partisans were active in the rear of the 16th and 18th German Armies, also part of Army Group North. Field Marshal von Leeb, who commanded it, was forced to abandon his trips to the troops and attract part of the forces operating at the front to protect the rear. Later, analyzing the reasons for stopping their troops on the Kingisepp - Luga line, the Hitler command explained this by two circumstances:the increased resistance of the Soviet troops and the actions of the partisans on the communications. The actions of partisan units at the end of July and in the first half of August 1941 in the rear of Army Group North, and especially in the rear of the 4th Panzer Group, were the first planned concentrated attacks of the partisans in the war. They were assigned an active role in the strategic defensive operation of the Soviet troops of the North-western direction. For the first time, the actions of the partisans are consistent and merge with the strikes of the troops of the Active Army. Such actions of the partisans in the initial, most difficult period of the war formed a new strategic factor, which led the Nazis in mid-September 1941 to say that the partisan movement poses a threat to the fascist "leadership of the war".

Military-historical works do not reveal the influence of the uprising in the Leningrad region in the autumn and winter of 1943 on the situation on the fronts of the entire North-Western direction, do not show the activities of the partisans who, on the eve of the decisive battles for the complete liberation of Leningrad from the blockade, almost completely paralyzed the railway and highway communications of the the transfer of the enemy's operational reserves to the offensive was prevented 29 . In general, it should be noted that the offensive actions of the Soviet troops in the North-western direction, especially the troops of the Leningrad and Volkhov fronts, proceeded in close cooperation with the partisans, and this interaction was to a certain extent exemplary. Commander of the Volkhov Front K. A. Meretskov noted: "The offensive launched by the Soviet troops in the last decade of January (1944-Yu. P.) coincided with a series of strikes organized by the Central Headquarters of the partisan movement (here K. A. Meretskov is not entirely accurate, using the word "coincided": the partisan strikes organized by the TSHPD were undertaken on the instructions of the Supreme High Command Headquarters and coordinated with the General Staff. - Yu. P.), inflicted by partisans on the German rear." "It seems to me," K. A. Meretskov writes further, " that this joint operation has few equals in terms of harmony. I believe that historians will pay special attention to this interaction between partisans and Red Army troops. " 30
The role of partisans in the Battle of Moscow, especially during the Soviet counteroffensive, is not properly considered in the military-historical literature .31 Meanwhile, when planning it

28 "Kriegstagebuch des Oberkommandos der Wehrmacht". Bd. I. Frankfurt am Main. 1965, S. 447.

29 M. V. Savin, V. I. Sidorov. The defeat of the Germans near Leningrad (January-February 1944). Moscow, 1945; V. P. Sviridov, V. P. Yakutovich, V. E. Vasilenko. Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944. L. 1962; "Battle for Leningrad 1941-1944". M. 1964.

30 K. A. Meretskov. In the service of the people, Moscow, 1968, p. 357.

31 "The defeat of German troops near Moscow". Operational and strategic essay. Hch. I-II. M. 1943; E. A. Shilovsky. The defeat of German troops near Moscow, Moscow, 1943; "The Great Battle of Moscow". A brief sketch, Moscow, 1961, et al.

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It also took into account the increasing activity of Soviet partisans in the rear of Army Group Center. 32 And the actions of the regular troops proceeded in full correlation with the actions of the partisans. In January 1942, the Smolensk partisans liberated 40 villages in the Znamensky district. Immediately, our airborne units began to land there. In mid-February, they liberated the town of Dorogobuzh. Immediately, units of the 1st Guards Cavalry Corps, sent by the Soviet command to the rear of the Nazi troops, entered the area. The Smolensk partisans then liberated several regional centers of their region, provided real assistance to the Red Army in liberating Yelnya and Sukhinichi. Together with paratroopers and cavalry units of the Red Army, they disorganized an important section of the main communication line of Army Group Center - the Smolensk-Vyazma railway and highway. Smolensk partisans also cut the Vyazma - Bryansk and Smolensk - Sukhinichi railways. Hitler's command was forced to throw regular formations against the partisans.

Unfortunately, the role of Soviet partisans is also not shown when covering another major battle of the Great Patriotic War and the entire Second World War-the Battle of Kursk 33 . Meanwhile, perhaps in no previous battle had partisan actions had such an impact on the course of events as during the Battle of Kursk - literally at all its stages: on its preparation and conduct, on the retreat of the German-fascist troops. The Nazis could not begin to implement the Citadel plan until they had conducted an operation against the Orel partisans operating in the rear of Army Group Center. More than 10 divisions were thrown against the partisans in May and June - a whole army group of 34 troops . Moreover, among these formations were those divisions that were intended for the offensive according to the "Citadel"plan. For a whole month, the Nazis fought intense battles in the Bryansk forests. The fascist command considered the operation against the Orel partisans as an integral part of its summer offensive. Conducting operations against the partisans, along with other moments, forced the Nazis to postpone the implementation of the Citadel plan. In addition, the divisions intended for the offensive and participating in punitive operations against the partisans suffered significant losses. And most importantly, the moral factor began to exert its influence: Hitler's soldiers were convinced that they could not suppress the partisans, that large partisan forces continued to operate in their rear.

One of the characteristic aspects of the preparation of Operation Citadel is the unprecedented concentration of military equipment - aircraft, tanks, artillery - on a relatively narrow section of the front. The Nazi command did everything possible to maximize the power of this technique. He developed special measures for the uninterrupted delivery of fuel and ammunition to the troops stationed on the Kursk Bulge. The partisans (mainly Belarusian and Oryol partisans) are essentially attacking the enemy's communications.,

32 Describing this interaction, G. K. Zhukov, then commander of the Western Front, writes: "In the rear of the enemy, the front command sent ski units, cavalry and airborne troops, which smashed the retreating enemy. There, coordinating their actions with the Military Councils of the fronts, the partisans launched a fight against the enemy. Their actions seriously complicated the situation" (G. K. Zhukov. Memoirs and Reflections, Moscow, 1969, p. 378).

33 "The Battle of Kursk". Short essay, Moscow, 1945; "The Battle of Kursk". Books 1 and 2. Moscow, 1946-1947; D. Selivanov. Kursk Battle, Moscow, 1956; I. I. Markin. On the Kursk Bulge, Moscow, 1961; "Battle of Kursk", Moscow, 1963, etc.

34 "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945" Vol. 3. Moscow, 1964, p. 42.

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they disrupted the delivery of fuel for aviation, and to a large extent-for tanks. As a result, by the beginning of the Battle of Kursk, the enemy's aviation fuel reserves did not increase, but, on the contrary, decreased. In the 6th Air Fleet, which supported Army Group Center, fuel reserves were reduced by one-third. Hitler's command stated in this regard: "The fuel supply was reduced, which was extremely difficult as a result of partisan actions, the 6th Air Fleet in June 1943, before the start of Operation Citadel, spent 8634 tons of aviation fuel, but received only 5,722 tons during the same time. Therefore, the tactical use of aviation was regulated by the availability of fuel. " 35 In other words, the partisans, by preventing the delivery of fuel, reduced the effectiveness of the 6th Air Fleet's actions in Operation Citadel by at least one-third. Close to this was the situation in the 4th Air Fleet, which supported the troops of Army Group South. Finally, the partisans had their say in the withdrawal of the German-Fascist formations after the defeat in Operation Citadel. It was not without reason that at a meeting at the Wehrmacht headquarters in late July 1943, Field Marshal von Kluge, commander of Army Group Center, complained to Hitler: "I have partisans everywhere in my rear... Troops are being destroyed near the Bryansk forests, which are overrun by partisans... " 36 .

The absence in many military-historical works devoted to the Great Patriotic War of showing the comprehensive role of the partisans, their significance in the destruction of the Hitlerite military machine impoverishes these works, and, accordingly, the history of the Soviet partisan movement, coverage of the activities of our Headquarters, which considered its leadership of the partisan movement as an integral part of the leadership of the entire struggle against the Nazi invaders. It is impossible to fully show any more or less major battle of the Great Patriotic War that took place on Soviet soil without revealing the role of the partisans in it, their joint actions with the Red Army. Therefore, in the military-historical work, when describing the military-political situation, it is necessary to take into account the state of the partisan movement, its influence on the operational and strategic situation in the most important areas of the Soviet-German front, on the position of individual fronts, to note the specific contribution of the partisans, their role in operations, to show the interaction of the partisans with the Red Army, the most important features of the Soviet military art of the Great Patriotic War period.

If we talk about special literature on the partisan movement of the period of the Great Patriotic War, then at first glance it may seem that there is quite a lot of it. It is published by central publishing houses, and even more - by republican and regional ones. But this is mainly popular literature - so-called documentary stories, essays. Very little basic scientific literature is published - less than one-fifth of all publications on partisan topics. This is many times less than on other issues of the history of the Great Patriotic War. Among this literature, monographs and studies covering the partisan movement as a whole are literally rare. During the 25 years after the end of the Great Patriotic War, only one monograph devoted to the partisan movement as a whole was published - this is the work of L. N. Bychkov. 37 Few studies are published on individual most important issues.-

35 " Top secret! Command only!", p. 394.

36 Ibid., pp. 515-516.

37 L. N. Bychkov. Partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War. 1941-1945 (short essay), Moscow, 1965.

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problems of the partisan movement. Of these books, only three can be named. In 1962, a paper by P. Vershigora and V. Zebolov was published, which deals with partisan raids .38 At the same time, A. I. Zalessky's book appeared 39 . Recently, a monograph was published on the disruption of the military and economic policy of the German-fascist occupiers .40
The situation is somewhat better with the coverage of the partisan struggle in individual republics, territories and regions. Local publishing houses have published a number of works that examine the partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War on the scale of the republic, region, and region. P. P. Lipilo's work deserves a positive assessment 41 . This book remains one of the best works on the partisan movement in terms of its source base, methodology of approach to research, and generalizations. Other works devoted to the partisan movement deserve high praise 42 . A number of issues of partisan struggle in individual republics and regions are discussed in the book "Soviet Partisans" 43 . But, as it has already been noted in the press, along with informative, interesting articles, there are also descriptive, factual materials . Despite all the political and scientific significance of the above-mentioned studies on the partisan struggle in certain republics, territories and regions, without general works on the history of the partisan movement, it is impossible to imagine in full, deeply and comprehensively such a complex historical phenomenon as the people's struggle behind enemy lines. At the same time, it should be noted that there is still no special research on the partisan movement in a number of republics and regions that were subjected to Hitler's occupation (Estonia, Moscow, Tula, Voronezh regions, etc.). Therefore, historians are faced with the task of continuing to study the partisan movement in all republics and regions at a higher scientific level, creating new works, attracting fresh forces to the study of this issue. The current state of development of the history of the partisan movement allows us to start creating works on a group of regions, regions and republics that are similar in nature to the struggle. This will make it possible to show the picture of the people's struggle more fully, to reveal new patterns of the partisan movement. But the main thing is to create generalizing works on the partisan movement as a whole, on its most important theoretical and practical problems.

It is precisely such works that determine the state of historical science and make it possible to raise the level of all literature on the subject under consideration.

38 P. Vershigora, V. Zebolov. Partisan raids (from the history of the partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union 1941-1945). Chisinau. 1962.

39 A. I. Zalessky. In partisan territories and zones. Patriotic feat of the Soviet peasantry behind enemy lines (1941-1944). Moscow, 1962.

40 M. M. Zagorulko, A. F. Yudenkov. The collapse of the economic plans of fascist Germany in the temporarily occupied territory of the USSR. Moscow, 1970.

41 P. P. Lipilo. CPB-organizer and leader of the partisan movement in Belarus during the Great Patriotic War. Minsk. 1959.

42 V. P. Samson. Partisan movement in Northern Latvia during the Great Patriotic War (Historical sketch). Riga. 1950; V. Klokov, I. Kulik, I. Slinko. Народна боротьба на Украiнi в роки Великоi Вiтчизняноi вiйнi. Kiiv. 1957; E. N. Shamko. Partisan movement in the Crimea in 1941-1944 Simferopol. 1959; P. R. Sheverdalkin. Partisan struggle on the Novgorod land. Novgorod, 1957; same name. Heroic Struggle of the Leningrad Partisans, L. 1959, et al.

43 "Soviet partisans". From the history of the partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War, Moscow, 1963.

44 A. M. Samsonov, A. A. Kurnosov. Decree, op., p. 108.

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How is the partisan movement presented in scientific historical journals, and how is it reflected in dissertations? The place allocated to a particular topic in the journal, and most importantly, the scientific level of published articles reflect the state of its development. Dissertations reflect this state equally. The subject matter of materials on the partisan movement published in magazines is generally not objectionable. However, articles on the partisan movement are still not a frequent visitor to their pages, and their number has even decreased over the past five years, and, even sadder, the scientific level of published materials is decreasing .45 Articles and materials on partisan topics also appear on the pages of scientific notes, collections of higher educational institutions. However, in terms of their depth and content, they noticeably lag behind the articles and materials published in journals.

The partisan theme took a strong place immediately after the end of the Great Patriotic War in PhD theses: in the first decade after the war, more than 60 theses were defended on this problem. Among them, a significant number were devoted to the history of individual partisan formations. The partisan theme in the dissertation works has retained its place to this day. Currently, almost every tenth dissertation on the Great Patriotic War is devoted to partisans. Since the mid-1950s, there has been a change in the subject matter of PhD theses on the partisan movement. The range of issues is being significantly expanded. The problems of party leadership of the partisan movement are being developed more profoundly. 46 More and more dissertations are devoted to the activities of regional party organizations in the leadership of the partisan struggle, the activities of the Komsomol in the occupied territory .47 There are dissertations that summarize the experience of partisan struggle on a broader basis - on the scale of the republic, a group of regions, as well as dissertations on individual large cities.

45 In Voprosy Istorii magazine, only one article out of more than 20 articles about the Great Patriotic War was devoted to the partisan movement over the past five years. It is certainly important in its subject matter, but it is a local one - it examines one of the elements of control in the partisan movement: "Radio communication in the Soviet partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War "(No. 5, 1969). The magazine Voprosy Istorii CPSU published four articles and reports during this time. But not all of them are equal. The largest number of articles on the partisan movement - five - over the past five years has been published by the Military Historical Journal. This is approximately one-twentieth of all his materials on the Great Patriotic War. This is probably not enough for a special military history magazine either. But most importantly, not all of them are written at the proper level. For example, D. Naumov's article " Tactics of the Belarusian Partisans "(No. 11, 1970) is noticeably inferior in content and level to the articles of M. Absalyamov, V. Andrianov, and T. Lesnyak. (It seems to us that if the author decided to investigate the tactics of the Belarusian partisans, then he must first of all reveal its originality, show how it was defined and how it differed from the tactics of the partisans of other occupied regions - Smolensk, Leningrad, Oryol.) The journal Istoriya SSSR, which at one time called for a comprehensive and in - depth study of the history of the partisan movement, has somewhat lost interest in partisan topics (see the editorial in No. 2 for 1961: "Let's create a history of the people's partisan movement of 1941-1945"). Over the past five years, the magazine has published only two articles on the partisan movement.

46 N. V. Tropkin. Bolsheviks-leaders of the partisan movement in the Orel region, Moscow, 1947; N. I. Makarov. Partisan movement and Bolshevik Underground in the Kalinin Region during the Great Patriotic War, Moscow, 1948 -; N. G. Bystritskaya. Smolensk Communists in the partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War. Yerevan. 1952.

47 Almost all of them were published: R. Ablova. It was in Belarus (from the history of youth struggle in partisan detachments and the underground). Moscow, 1957; P. T. Tronko. Immortality of the young (from the history of the struggle of the Komsomol underground of Ukraine against the Nazi invaders during the Great Patriotic War). Moscow, 1958, et al.

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problems of the partisan movement 48 , among them, of course, and doctoral 49 . The article also examines a very important issue from the history of the partisan movement - the interaction of partisans with the Red Army .50 Evidence of the still insufficient scientific level of many dissertations on partisan topics is that only a part of them are published in the form of monographs - less than one third. Almost all dissertations have one common drawback - they have very little developed historiography, which, as a rule, is reduced to a bibliography.

Memoirs have a significant share among the literature about the partisan struggle. They make up more than a fifth of all books about the partisan movement. Being one of the most important sources that help to better understand past events and consider them more comprehensively, this literature cannot but attract the attention of historians. By its nature and level, memoir literature is unequal and has undergone certain changes in the post-war period. If in the first post-war years memoir literature was based almost entirely on personal memories and impressions of participants in the partisan struggle, 51 then later memoirists increasingly began to attract documentary material .52 This raised the importance of memoirs, their scientific value. The authors of such memoirs seem to have brought back to life many important documents of the war period, restored the historical background of that time .53 As a rule, the greater the role played by the author of memoirs in the partisan movement, the more substantial and rich in material his memoirs are, the more deeply many large and complex issues of the history of partisan struggle are revealed.

48 V. G. Vershinin. Political and educational work of the Communist Party among the population and partisans of Ukraine during the temporary fascist occupation (1941-1945). Kiev, 1953; N. I. Sobolev. The role of the press in the ideological work of the party behind enemy lines during the Great Patriotic War (1941-1943). (Based on the materials of the Bryansk, Kursk and Oryol regions), Moscow, 1964; V. F. Nadimyanov. Ideological and political work of underground party organizations and partisan formations among the population of the western regions of the Ukrainian SSR during the Great Patriotic War. Drohobych, 1966; N. G. Palamarchuk. Party and political work in the partisan formations of Ukraine during the Great Patriotic War (June 1941-October 1944). Kharkiv, 1967; V. V. Silenkov. Mass-political work of underground party organizations in the territory of the Western regions of the RSFSR occupied by German-fascist troops during the Great Patriotic War. Moscow, 1968; G. T. Gorobets. Party Underground in Ukraine during the Great Patriotic War (1941-1944). Moscow, 1969; V. E. Bystrov. Activity of the Communist Party in organizing the underground in the Soviet territory occupied by the fascist invaders, Moscow, 1970.

49 P. R. Sheverdalkin. Communist Party-organizer of the struggle of the Soviet people in the rear of the German-fascist army Group "North" (June 1941-October 1944). L. 1962; I. L. Demyanchuk. Use words. Print of the party underground and partisan formations during the Great Patriotic War of 1941-1945. Kiev, 1966; A. F. Yudenkov. Political work among the population of the occupied regions of the USSR (1941-1944). Moscow, 1970.

50 V. I. Lemeshonok. Assistance of the Belarusian people to the Red Army in defeating the Nazi invaders on the territory of Belarus (September 1943-July 1944). Minsk. 1965; P. F. Avtonomov. Combat interaction of Ukrainian partisans with Soviet troops in the Battle for the Dnieper (September-December 1943). Kiev, 1967.

51 P. Ignatov. Zapiski partizan [Notes of a Partisan], Moscow, 1949; D. Medvedev. It was near Rovno. M. 1948. V. A. Andreev. Narodnaya voina [People's War], Moscow, 1949; S. A. Kovpak. From Putivl to the Carpathians, Moscow, 1949; D. Bakradze. The blood of heroes. Tbilisi. 1953; P. Vershigora. People with a Clear conscience, Moscow, 1952; G. Linkov. War behind enemy Lines, Moscow, 1956.

52 The collections of memoirs of participants of the partisan movement "From the history of the partisan movement in Belarus (1941-1944)"were positively received. Minsk. 1961; "Unconquered Belarus", Moscow, 1963; "Explosions on the highway". Bryansk, 1963, and others.

53 A. F. Fedorov. Underground Regional Committee of Ukraine (Partisan movement in Chernihiv region and Volhynia). Moscow, 1961; V. I. Kozlov. People of a special warehouse, Moscow, 1962; Vol. 1 ch. Nash pozivny-svoboda. Киiв. 1964; П. З. Калинин. The Partisan Republic. Minsk. 1968; I. D. Dmitriev. Notes of Comrade D. L. 1969.

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Of course, the personal abilities of the author are also important: the ability to see and highlight the main thing, the main thing, to convey all this to the reader. In general, the memoirs devoted to the partisan struggle in the occupied territory deserve high praise. They are undoubtedly a valuable source for studying the Soviet partisan movement. Unfortunately, the memoirs of major organizers of the partisan movement, especially party workers, are still not widely published.

In many respects, memoir literature is joined by monographs and articles written by direct participants of the partisan movement. Knowledge of the situation and the complexity of the struggle gives them the opportunity to reveal and show such historical details that are often inaccessible to a historian who uses only documents. That is why the informative works of A. S. Asmolov, who led the partisan movement in the North-Western Front, Z. A. Bogatyr, commissar of one of the Ukrainian partisan formations, P. K. Ponomarenko, head of the Central Command Post, V. P. Samukhin, commander of the partisan detachment, and then chief of staff of Brigade 54, are of great interest .

The so-called popular literature-nonfiction stories, essays-is estimated to account for more than three-fifths of all partisan literature. As a rule, it is local in its content, describes events that are limited to the scope of a squad, brigade, underground group, or organization, and less often - on the scale of a district or city. The importance of such literature should not, however, be underestimated: it is determined by the mass nature of its distribution, a certain emotional impact on the reader. Accessibility, entertainment, the very form of presentation-all this gives such literature a wide reader and thus the opportunity to have a great educational impact, especially on young people. In addition, it restores many glorious pages of the partisan struggle in the memory of the current generation. All this is a positive aspect of popular literature devoted to the partisan movement. Among the books that make up the popular literature on partisan struggle, there are some that cannot fail to attract the attention of historians. The merit of their authors is that they use a lot of new factual material, and most importantly, show the most characteristic of the events of the partisan war that took place in the occupied territory .55 Unfortunately, not all nonfiction stories and essays are written at the proper ideological, scientific and literary level. A characteristic shortcoming of many of them is that the authors focus on the story of the exploits of their heroes, but at the same time they are not always able to reveal the sources of their heroism, to trace its organic connection with the new qualities that the party has brought up in Soviet people. Often, too, in the pursuit of entertainment, historical credibility is lost.-

54 P. K. Ponomarenko. Behind enemy lines. "Novoe vremya", 1965, N 19; same name. The struggle of the Soviet people behind enemy lines. "Military-historical Journal", 1965, N 4; same name. Some issues of organizing the leadership of the partisan movement. "The Second World War. Resistance Movement in Europe", Moscow, 1966; V. P. Samukhin. Volkhov partisans. A story about the struggle of the Leningrad partisans in the Volkhov front. L. 1969; A. S. Asmolov. Behind the front line. "On the North-Western Front", Moscow, 1969; Z. A. Bogatyr. Fighting behind enemy lines (Combat activity of a partisan unit under the Command of Hero of the Soviet Union A. I. Saburov), Moscow, 1969.

55 You can, for example, note N. V. Masolov's book " Flint carves Fire "(Moscow, 1970). On the basis of concrete historical material, which is largely poorly researched by historians, the author shows in an accessible and imaginative form how the struggle against the invaders developed in the Gdovsky district, Leningrad region, during the initial, most difficult period of the Great Patriotic War.

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This inevitably reduces the cognitive value of such books. Speaking about popular literature, noting its usefulness, it should, of course, be emphasized that it needs to be supported by serious scientific literature, which should provide it with a foundation, as it were, and help it to reveal the full significance of what has never been seen before in the history of the partisan movement on the basis of the most vivid, typical facts from partisan life.

Speaking about the degree of research of some of the most important problems of the history of the national struggle in the territory occupied by the enemy, it should be noted that the main and central issue of developing the history of the partisan movement is a comprehensive disclosure of the leading role of the party in this movement.

V. I. Lenin, studying the laws of partisan struggle, showed that the most important condition for the success of a partisan movement is party leadership. He noted that "partisan combat actions must be carried out under the control of the party " 56 and pointed out the need to ennoble the partisan movement with the"educational and organizing influence of socialism"57 . The leadership of the party gives the partisan movement the main thing - ideological, as well as organizational strength, scope, and allows it to direct it to achieve a clearly set goal. Party leadership in guerrilla warfare is the main condition for its success. That is why the Central Committee of the Party, in its instructions on the development of the partisan struggle in the territory temporarily occupied by the enemy, paid special attention to the party leadership of this struggle. In a directive of July 18, 1941, the Central Committee of the Party demanded that the party committees of the occupied and threatened regions and districts "deploy a network of our Bolshevik underground organizations in the occupied territory to direct all actions against the fascist occupiers." 58 The creation of a wide network of underground party organizations ensured the party's leadership of the struggle behind enemy lines. Illegal party organizations were supposed to create armed partisan forces, underground organizations and groups in cities and other localities, and direct their actions. Naturally, the party organizations were also charged with conducting political work among the population.

Comprehensive coverage of the party leadership of the partisan movement is the task of all historical works devoted to the Great Patriotic War, and first of all historical and party works. Special attention should be paid to the study of the construction of a network of underground party organizations. However, the issues of party building in the territory occupied by the enemy in many historical and party works are essentially ignored, not analyzed, given factually 59, and sometimes with errors-

56 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 12, p. 229.

57 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 14, p. 9.

58 "The Communist Party during the Great Patriotic War", p. 537.

59 Unfortunately, without analyzing the specific features of party building caused by the specific conditions of the war, the creation of underground party organizations is considered in the article by T. A. Logunova " The emergence of the party underground and the partisan movement during the Great Patriotic War (June-December 1941). Series IX. History, No. 4, 1966, pp. 16-25). This work incorrectly covers the activities of the Central Committee Commission for the Leadership of Underground Party Organizations (p. 18). On the role of this Commission of the Central Committee of the Party, see P. K. Ponomarenko's explanation in his work " Some questions of organizing the leadership of the partisan movement "(p. 58).

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mi 60 . Some authors identify the network of Bolshevik organizations (as it is called in the resolution of the Central Committee of the Party), especially in cities and other localities, with all other organizations - Komsomol, Komsomol youth, sabotage-calling all this "party underground". Of course, in a certain sense of the word, the entire partisan movement was partisan, communist. But this does not mean that the line should be blurred between the underground party organizations that represent the party in the occupied territory and the entire Soviet partisan movement that, under the leadership of these party organizations, is waging a struggle against the Hitlerite invaders. At the same time, the activities of the party network should not be separated from the entire struggle of the Soviet people in the rear of Hitler's troops. All this is largely due to the fact that the general issues of party building during the Great Patriotic War are not developed, and the peculiarity of the party's activities caused by the war, especially in the territory occupied by the enemy, is not revealed.

The reorganization of the party in a military way with the country's entry into the war was expressed primarily in the strengthening of organizational centralism, in the certain curtailment of the collective organs of party organization, in the redistribution of forces in the interests of war, in the improvement of discipline, and in the strict and prompt implementation by the Communists of all decisions of higher bodies. The conditions of war inevitably brought to life extraordinary forms of party leadership of the country, its armed forces, the national economy, and the struggle in the territory captured by the enemy. The construction of party organizations in the occupied regions was characterized by rigid centralism and a certain restriction of internal party democracy. 61 The situation did not allow for the election of party bodies, much less their reporting to their organizations. Co-optation and assignment became the rule. In practical work, various forms of party organization were born.

Who did the network of Bolshevik underground organizations consist of, and who represented the party in the territory temporarily occupied by the enemy? The Party there, as in the whole Soviet land, was represented, first, by the party organs, which, as a rule, exercised direct leadership of the struggle, and, secondly, by the primary party organizations. Often in the occupied territories, instead of the usual party bodies - committees (regional, city, district) - "troikas", "centers" were created, which performed the functions of party bodies. The institution of commissioners has become quite widespread,

60 B. V. Shchetinin, in his work" The creation and activity of Soviet authorities in the rear of the German-fascist troops", for example, states that "The Leningrad Regional Committee of the CPSU (b) at the beginning of the war created 125 party and over 100 Komsomol underground bodies in the occupied territory of the region" (Voprosy Istorii CPSU, 1970, No. 6, p. 97). Such a large number of party bodies could not be created, as 51 districts were completely occupied and 12 districts were partially occupied. In total, in the Leningrad region in 1941, 28 district party committees became illegal. In general, in the Leningrad Region at the beginning of the war, special party bodies were not created to lead the struggle in the territory captured by the enemy, as was the case, for example, in Ukraine and Belarus. In the Leningrad region, as the Soviet troops withdrew, the previously existing district committees of the CPSU (b), almost in full strength, in accordance with the instructions of the regional committee, went to an illegal position (this, by the way, was the peculiarity of building the party underground in the Leningrad region). This made it possible at the beginning of the war to have strong and influential party bodies in the region on its occupied territory, which largely determined the scope of the partisan struggle. More than 100 underground Komsomol bodies were not created in the Leningrad Region either. B. V. Shchetinin's work also contains other errors and inaccuracies.

61 This is also typical of the construction of Soviet organs on the territory of the partisan territories.

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party organizers - party salesmen. They also had the rights of party organs. Political departments also appeared in the territory occupied by the enemy as party organs. Depending on the situation, the party organs were located either in localities or in partisan detachments and formations.

How were the party's primary organizations built in the occupied territory? In the armed partisan forces, party organizations are generally known to have been established in accordance with the Party's Charter. But in cities and other localities, there was a great difference in the construction of primary organizations. In its resolution of July 18, 1941 "On the organization of the struggle in the rear of the German troops", the Central Committee of the Party, taking into account the difficulty and at the same time the necessity of having party organizations in cities, towns, and railway stations, proposed to include non-party organizations in the party organizations. In this connection, the Central Committee of the Party pointed out that the most persistent leading party, Soviet and Komsomol workers, as well as non-party members loyal to the Soviet government, who were familiar with the conditions of the districts to which they were being sent, should be sent to organize underground communist cells .62 All this was a definite departure from the Party's Charter, caused by the specific conditions of the war. By including in the communist cells non-party workers who were deeply devoted to the ideas of the party and the Soviet government, and who were ready and able to fight the invaders in the difficult conditions of occupation, including the Komsomol members,the Central Committee of the party, in fact, restored the institute of sympathizers that existed in the party in 1918-1919 and in 1934-1939. Depending on the number of party members and candidates in communist cells, they were either full-fledged primary organizations, or party-candidate and party-Komsomol groups, in accordance with the Party Charter.

Thus, party organs, communist cells in localities, and party organizations of partisan detachments formed a network of Bolshevik organizations and party underground in the occupied territory. In this particular form, so to speak, the party was present in the territory temporarily occupied by the enemy. However, despite the fact that there are historical and party studies in almost all the regions that were subjected to Nazi occupation, we do not yet have complete data on how the party network was built in each of them. This is especially true for the construction of party cells. In every historical and party work devoted to the party's activities in the occupied territory, first of all, the issues of building an underground party network, its specifics, the number of party organizations, the scope of their activities (territorial and temporary), etc. should be considered. 63 The specific party leadership, as a rule, determined the scope and strength of the partisan movement in the republic, region, or district.

Basically, the Komsomolskaya Pravda was built on the same principles

62 "History of the Communist Party of the Soviet Union", Vol. 5, book I. M. 1970, p. 167.

63 In some works, when covering the network of party organizations, especially in the initial period of the Great Patriotic War, a certain inaccuracy is allowed: often the number of party bodies and primary organizations that were created in the pre-occupation period and those that went into an illegal situation, that is, started practical activities, is not indicated. V. I. Klokov, I. T. Kulik and I. I. Slinko's highly appreciated book "The People's Struggle in Ukraine during the Great Patriotic War" indicates that in 1941 23 underground regional committees, 63 city committees and 564 district committees were created in Ukraine (p. 22). But this number of party organs was created in the pre-occupation period, and only a part of them became illegal.

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net. However, some party committees did not create special leading Komsomol bodies, and the leadership of underground Komsomol organizations was entrusted directly to the party bodies. The same people often, in turn, singled out one of the members of the party body to work among the Komsomol members, as well as non-Union youth. If our historical and party works devoted to the partisan movement do not pay due attention to the analysis of the construction and state of the illegal party network, such a lack is even more relevant to the works dealing with the activities of the Komsomol in the occupied territory. In the vast majority of them, we do not find an answer to the question of what kind of Komsomol network there was in the district, region, or republic. But these works have another major drawback: they poorly cover the main issue - the party leadership of the Komsomol underground. As a rule, these works are very factual, and they often reduce everything to individual heroic examples .64 Each work that examines the activities of the Komsomol and young people behind enemy lines during the Great Patriotic War, and it is desirable to have much more such works (young people in the partisan movement accounted for more than half of its participants), is primarily intended to reveal the party leadership of the Komsomol in specific conditions of partisan struggle, analyze the construction and activities of the network of Komsomol organizations, ways, forms and methods of involving young people in the partisan movement.

V. I. Lenin in his work" Partisan War " pointed out that Marxism recognizes the most diverse forms of partisan struggle. "We," wrote V. I. Lenin, "have not the slightest pretensions to impose on practitioners any invented form of struggle, or even to decide from the Cabinet the question of the role of certain forms of guerrilla warfare in the general course of the Russian civil war." 65 He noted that the first Russian Revolution enriched guerrilla warfare with new forms.

To an even greater extent, this applies to the Great Patriotic War. Therefore, it is natural that in the works covering the partisan movement, it is important to explore these new forms, to show the new things that the partisan movement of the Great Patriotic War period brought to the arsenal of partisan warfare. One of the new moments, of course, was the interaction of the partisans with the Red Army, actions on railway communications, fighting in cities and other settlements, and the disruption of the enemy's political, military and economic activities by the population .66
64 Similar shortcomings are largely characteristic of dissertations. Take, for example, G. I. Zhukov's dissertation "Mass-political work of the Leningrad Party organization among partisan youth during the Great Patriotic War" (L. 1970). It almost does not reveal the party leadership of the Komsomol, its characteristic features in the specific conditions of partisan struggle in the region, and does not show the network of Komsomol organizations. And without this, it is difficult to really show a broad mass-political work among the partisan youth. The second chapter of the dissertation is entitled: "Deployment of political and educational work of regional and local underground party and Komsomol bodies...". The question is, what underground party and Komsomol bodies were in the Leningrad region, what are these new bodies? The author of the dissertation published the work "On the history of interaction between young people of military and partisan formations in the battles for Leningrad". What can be the "interaction" of the youth of military and partisan formations, when there was a front between Them? Issues of interaction between military and partisan formations were resolved not by the youth and its organizations, but by the military councils of fronts, armies, and partisan movement Headquarters.

65 V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 14, pp. 11-12.

66 In some works attempts are made to limit the Soviet partisan Movement only to the actions of armed partisan forces - partisan detachments,

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It should be noted that the study of partisan struggle in cities and other localities during the Great Patriotic War (which is often referred to as the underground in our literature) lags far behind the study of the activities of armed partisan formations. The beginning of coverage of the struggle in cities and other localities in our literature was laid by the volumes "History of the Great Patriotic War of the Soviet Union", continued and developed in the collections "Heroes of the Underground" 67 . The struggle in cities and other localities has taken on a huge scale. In terms of its size, this underground was not inferior to armed partisan formations. Of course, it is much more difficult to study the struggle of the underground (in the sense of a source base) than the struggle of armed partisan formations. Many large underground organizations were destroyed, the vast majority of their members were destroyed, and almost no documents remained about these organizations. Restoring the history of these organizations and the entire underground is the most important task of historians who study the heroic struggle of our people during the Great Patriotic War.

From the standpoint of Lenin's approach to explaining the sources of the partisan movement, taking into account the nature of the Great Patriotic War, the leading role of the party in this war, it is necessary to consider some practical issues of developing the history of partisan struggle. The character of the Great Patriotic War, associated with the victory of socialism, and the daily leadership of the Communist Party gave the Soviet partisan movement a high level of ideology. It was the high moral and political qualities that distinguished both the soldier of the regular armed forces-the Red Army, and the warrior of the irregular front - the partisan. Both the Red Army soldier and the Soviet partisan fought for socialism. This raises the question of whether the term "people's avengers"used in our research is correct. This term does not accurately reflect the moral and political image of the Soviet partisan. Rather, the term "people's fighter"is more appropriate to him. Another term used for underground organizations in localities is also not entirely accurate. In some studies, they are called "anti-fascist". The war was, of course, anti-fascist, but the main content of it for the Soviet people was the struggle in defense of socialism, against the aggressive forces of imperialism. Therefore, the political content of this struggle was, so to speak, higher. Not by accident

D. F. Engels, as is well known, in a number of his military works equated popular resistance with partisan warfare (see F. Engels. The military situation in France. K. Marx and F. Engels, Soch. Vol. 17, p. 4. 188). In the work "Prussian Frantirers" by F. Engels refers to partisan warfare as insurrections, peasant resistance, and franco-guerrilla actions, i.e., various forms of partisan struggle (ibid., p. 209). V. I. Lenin paid special attention to the mass resistance of the people as a form of partisan struggle. In his work "Bloody Days in Moscow", he also refers to the guerrilla war as continuous strikes and other unarmed actions that stop industrial life, sow discontent with the state of things in all the "circles of the people" (see V. I. Lenin. PSS. Vol. 11, p. 317). V. I. Lenin, responding to the Menshevik Larin, who dogmatically he claimed that after the defeat of the December armed uprising and other armed actions in 1905 - 1906, the partisan war in Russia against tsarism, the landlords and capitalists ceased, that only a "passive" revolution continued, and in the article "The Crisis of Menshevism" in December 1906 he wrote: "...Don't be doctrinaire, gentlemen: look at what this "constant ferment" of the countryside means, along with "petty struggles," "punitive expeditions," and the change of police and army personnel.... The state of affairs you describe is nothing more than a prolonged partisan war, interrupted by a series of increasingly broad and cohesive explosions of soldiers 'uprisings" (V. I. Lenin, PSS. Vol. 14, p. 153).

67 "Heroes of the underground". About the underground struggle of Soviet patriots in the rear of the Nazi invaders during the Great Patriotic War. Issue 1-2. Moscow, 1970.

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The Nazis called our partisan movement "communist." The term "anti-fascist organizations" is more appropriate for other countries, where elements of different political beliefs often participated in the struggle against fascism.

It is also necessary to pay attention to such an important issue as the number of participants in the nationwide struggle behind enemy lines, both those who were members of armed partisan formations, and those who fought in cities and other settlements as part of underground organizations and groups. Recently, new data on the number of participants in the struggle in the territory temporarily occupied by the enemy began to appear in the press. Moreover, these data are most often not supported by any arguments. Of course, the question of determining the number of participants in the partisan struggle is far from simple. V. I. Lenin, describing the civil war, which, according to his definition, "differs from an ordinary war in immeasurably greater complexity," wrote that in a civil war it is difficult to draw a line "between those who are in the ranks of the belligerents and those who are not"68 . This also applies to the partisan movement. All this obliges us to pay special attention to determining the number of participants in the partisan struggle. When specifying each new figure, a scientific justification and disclosure of the calculation method are required. This is an elementary requirement. It is necessary to show the national partisan movement, its scale and scope in a politically correct, truly scientific and truthful way.

Thus, despite the fact that since the Great Patriotic War, considerable work has been done to study the history of national partisan warfare behind enemy lines and a significant amount of literature on this issue has been published, the main and fundamental issue remains the deep development of all aspects of the party leadership of this struggle, its sources. Along with a more detailed study of the partisan movement in individual regions and republics, major generalizing works on the main problems of this movement are needed. Special attention should be paid to the new developments that have enriched the theory and practice of guerrilla warfare in the struggle of the Soviet people against the Nazi invaders. I would like to have works that reveal the struggle of the working class, the working people in cities and industrial centers; the study of this aspect of the struggle of the Soviet people still lags behind the study of the actions of the armed partisan forces. More in-depth research is needed on the activities of the Komsomol in enemy-occupied territory, especially its party leadership. Given the enormous contribution of the Soviet partisans to the defeat of the German-fascist troops, researchers should focus on revealing the partisan movement as the most important political and military-strategic factor in the war, on a comprehensive demonstration of its influence on the situation of the parties at the front, its role at certain stages of the war, in battles and battles for the liberation of our land.

V. I. Lenin. 68 PSS. Vol. 13, pp. 72-73.

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